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Joint Ministerial foreword
Our world is now a digital one. From connecting with loved ones, to the way we do business
and deliver public services - almost every part of our lives is at least now partly online.
But the COVID-19 pandemic has shone a spotlight on the risks posed by harmful activity and
content online. The pandemic drove a spike in disinformation and misinformation, and some
people took advantage of the uncertainty to incite fear and cause confusion. The pandemic 
has also underlined a much more grave problem; the risks posed to children online. In a
month-long period during lockdown, the Internet Watch Foundation and its partners blocked
at least 8.8 million attempts by UK internet users to access videos and images of children
suffering sexual abuse.1 
This government is unashamedly pro-tech. We are committed to using digital technologies
and services to power economic growth across the entire UK, and ensuring a more inclusive,
competitive and innovative digital economy for the future. We are taking action to unlock
innovation across digital markets, while also ensuring we keep people safe online and promote
a thriving democracy, where pluralism and freedom of expression are protected. To unleash
growth we need to ensure there is trust in technology.
The government’s response to online harms is a key part of our plans to usher in a new age
of accountability for tech companies, which is commensurate with the role they play in our
daily lives. Our ambition is to build public trust in the technologies that so many of us rely on.
Ultimately, we must be able to look parents in the eye and assure them we are doing
everything we can to protect their children from harm.
This response to the Online Harms White Paper sets out plans for a new duty of care to make
companies take responsibility for the safety of their users. It builds on our manifesto
commitment to introduce legislation to make the UK the safest place in the world to be online
but at the same time defend freedom of expression.
The legislation will define what harmful content will be in scope. Principally, this legislation will
tackle illegal activity taking place online and prevent children from being exposed to
inappropriate material. But the legislation will also address other types of harm that spread
1 ‘Millions of attempts to access child sexual abuse online during lockdown’ Internet Watch




       
  
 
              
          
            
        
 
         
         
          
  
 
           
        
     
 
        
   
 
          
        
        
          
       
 
               
       
       
            





      
    
   
      
     
 
online - from dangerous misinformation spreading lies about vaccines to destructive pro-
anorexia content.
These new laws will mean no more empty gestures - we will set out categories of harm in
secondary legislation and hold tech giants to account for the way they address this content on
their platforms. This approach will empower people to manage their online safety and ensure
that these companies will not be able to arbitrarily remove controversial viewpoints.
Alongside tackling harmful content this legislation will protect freedom of expression and
uphold media freedom. Companies will be required to have accessible and effective
complaints mechanisms so that users can object if they feel their content has been removed
unfairly.
And this regulation will be proportionate. Fewer than 3% of UK businesses will be in scope.
We will focus on the biggest, highest risk online companies where most illegal and harmful
activity is taking place.
This groundbreaking regulatory framework will be enshrined in law through the upcoming
Online Safety Bill.
Our criminal law must also be fit for the digital age and provide the protections that victims
deserve. The Law Commission is currently reviewing whether new offences are necessary to
deal with emerging issues such as cyber-flashing and 'pile-on' harassment. We will carefully 
consider using the online harms legislation to bring the Law Commission’s final
recommendations into law, where it is necessary and appropriate to do so.
As an independent country, the UK has the opportunity to set the global standard for a risk-
based, proportionate regulatory framework that protects citizens online and upholds their right
to freedom of expression. We will work with our international partners to develop common
approaches to this shared challenge, whilst delivering on our ambition to make the UK the
safest place in the world to go online. We will lead, but we are confident others will join us.
Rt Hon Oliver Dowden CBE MP Rt Hon Priti Patel MP
Secretary of State for Digital, Secretary of State for the Home 





   
 
           
             
      
       
       
        
      
         
          
 
             
           
         
         
       
         
       
             
   
  
         
      
         
       
       
          
 
         
            
      
        
       
       
         
      
            
 
 
    
 
           
     
         
Executive summary
1. The Online Harms White Paper set out the government’s ambition to make the UK the
safest place in the world to go online, and the best place to grow and start a digital business.
It described a new regulatory framework establishing a duty of care on companies to
improve the safety of their users online, overseen and enforced by an independent
regulator. This will build public trust in the services that these companies are offering, and
support a thriving and fast-growing digital sector. The White Paper proposed that regulation
be proportionate and risk-based, ensuring companies have appropriate systems and
processes in place to tackle harmful content and activity. It also made clear that the
framework will protect users’ rights, including freedom of expression online.
2. The government set out the results of the formal consultation and clarified its direction of
travel in the Online Harms White Paper - Initial government response, published in
February 2020. The initial government response reconfirmed our commitment to the duty
of care approach set out in the White Paper and announced a number of further measures
to increase proportionality and protect freedom of expression. It also indicated that the
government was minded to appoint Ofcom as the regulator. The government has continued
to develop its policy proposals since February and has made further, important changes.
The full government response confirms that Ofcom will be named as the regulator in
legislation, and sets out the intended policy position.
3. The government has taken a deliberately consultative and iterative approach in developing
the framework, to ensure regulation that is coherent, proportionate and agile in response
to advances in technology. It is part of the government’s overarching, pro-innovation
approach to regulating digital technologies, that will address issues arising from digital
technology which affect prosperity, security and our democratic values. This is an important
step forward in building a safer and more prosperous digital future for everyone.
4. Tackling online harms is a global problem and the government recognises that legislation 
and regulation in the UK, and elsewhere, forms only part of the response required. The UK,
with its strengths in digital innovation, highly respected legal system, business-friendly 
environment and world-class regulators, has an opportunity to act as a global leader in this
space. That is why the government is working closely with many of our international
partners to address this shared challenge in order to work towards common approaches to
tackling online harms. The development of the online harms regime represents an
important step in the UK’s strategy to create a coherent and pro-innovation framework for
the governance of digital technologies, and to set the global standard for a risk-based,
proportionate regulatory framework.
The continuing case for action
5. The internet has, in many ways, transformed our lives for the better. It has revolutionised
our ability to connect with each other and created previously inconceivable economic




           
      
 
            
          
             
  
 
           
            
          
            
           
     
 
          
     
           
               
   
        
          
          
           
  
 
           
       
           
          
         
     
 
       
      
  
    
  
    
  
     
   
  
    
  
     
 
   
  
   
 
2012 to 90.8% in 2019.2 In April 2020, internet users in the UK spent an average of 4 hours
2 minutes online each day, a record figure.3 
6. However, the case for robust regulatory action continues to grow. Over three quarters of
UK adults express a concern about going online,4 and fewer parents feel the benefits
outweigh the risks of their children being online, with the proportion falling from 65% in 2015
to 55% in 2019.5 
7. The White Paper set out the extensive evidence of illegal and harmful content and activity
taking place online. The government highlighted the prevalence of the most serious illegal
harms which threaten our national security and the physical safety of children. It also
explained how online services are being used as a tool for abuse. The White Paper
acknowledged growing concerns about the impact of harmful content on the wellbeing of 
children in particular. These problems have not gone away.
8. In terms of illegal content and activity, there were more than 69 million images and videos
related to child sexual exploitation and abuse referred by US technology companies to the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children in 2019,6 an increase of more than 50%
on the previous year.7 In 2019, of the over 260,000 reports assessed by the Internet Watch 
Foundation, 132,730 contained images and/or videos of children being sexually abused
(compared to 105,047 in 2018), and 46% of reports involved imagery depicting children
who appeared to be 10 years old or younger.8 Between its launch in January 2015 and
March 2019, 8.3 million images have been added to the Child Abuse Image Database.9 
The National Crime Agency estimates at least 300,000 individuals in the UK pose a sexual
threat to children.10 
9. Terrorist groups use the internet to spread propaganda designed to radicalise, recruit and
inspire vulnerable people, and to incite, provide information to enable, and celebrate
terrorist attacks. Some companies are taking positive steps to combat online terrorist
content. The larger platforms are already taking proactive measures and using automated
technology. For instance, Twitter actioned 95,887 unique accounts related to the promotion
of terrorism/violent extremism between January and June 2019.11 However, terrorists and
2 ‘Internet users’ Office for National Statistics, May 2019 (last viewed in November 2020) “Internet 
use” here refers to respondents who have used the internet in the last three months”
3 ‘Online Nation: narrative report’ Ofcom, June 2020 (last viewed in November 2020)
4 ‘Internet users’ concerns about and experience of potential online harms’ Ofcom and ICO, May 2019 
(last viewed in November 2020)
5 ‘Children and parents: Media use and attitudes report 2019’ Ofcom, February 2020 (last viewed in 
November 2020)
6 ‘CyberTipline’ National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (last viewed in November 2020)
7 ‘Tech Companies Detect a Surge in Online Videos of Child Sexual Abuse’ The New York Times, 
February 2020 (last viewed in November 2020)
8 ‘The Internet Watch Foundation Annual Report 2019’ The Internet Watch Foundation, April 2020
(last viewed in November 2020)
9 ‘Child sexual abuse - Appendix tables’ Office for National Statistics, January 2020 (last viewed in 
November 2020)
10 ‘Law enforcement in coronavirus online safety push as National Crime Agency reveals 300,000 in 
UK pose sexual threat to children’ National Crime Agency, April 2020 (last viewed in November 2020)




                 
           
         
       
 
           
         
            
           
          
      
 
        
           
           
             
           
     
           
      
 
          
       
           
         
       
 
         
          
             
         
         
   
         
         
   
 
 
    
  
    
  
     
    
   
     
 
     
     
their supporters continue to use a wide range of platforms to further their aims. It is critical
that industry works together, and that the government and industry continue to build on the
foundations laid by initiatives such as the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, to
prevent exploitation of the internet for terrorist purposes. 
10. Alongside illegal content and activity, the White Paper highlighted increasing levels of public 
concern about online content and activity which is lawful but potentially harmful. This type
of activity can range from online bullying and abuse, to advocacy of self-harm, to spreading
disinformation and misinformation. Whilst this behaviour may fall short of amounting to a
criminal offence it can have corrosive and damaging effects, creating toxic online
environments and negatively impacting users’ ability to express themselves online.
11. In 2019, according to research conducted by Ofcom and the Information Commissioner’s
Office, 23% of 12-15 year olds had experienced or seen bullying, abusive behaviour or
threats on the internet in the last 12 months.12 Nearly half of girls admit to holding back their
opinion on social media for fear of being criticised.13 Galop, the LGBT+ anti-violence
charity’s, most recent online hate crime survey highlighted that 8 in 10 respondents had
experienced anti-LGBT+ online abuse in the last 5 years.14 In 2019, the Community 
Security Trust, a charity that protects British Jews from antisemitism, saw a 50% rise in
reported anti-Semitic online incidents compared to 2018.15 
12. During the COVID-19 pandemic, digital technologies have brought huge benefits - from
unlocking innovation across public services, to enabling millions to work remotely, to
supporting people to stay in touch with their friends and families. However, the risks posed
by illegal and harmful content and activity online have also been thrown into sharp relief as
digital services have played an increasingly central role in our lives.
13. Research shows that 47% of children and teens have seen content that they wished they 
hadn’t seen during lockdown.16 In a month-long period during lockdown, the Internet Watch 
Foundation and its partners blocked at least 8.8 million attempts by UK internet users to
access videos and images of children suffering sexual abuse.17 The pandemic also drove
a spike in disinformation (the deliberate creation and dissemination of false and/or
manipulated information that is intended to deceive and mislead audiences) and
misinformation (inadvertently sharing false information) online. Social media has been the
biggest source of false or misleading information about 5G technologies and COVID-19
vaccinations during the pandemic.18 
12 ‘Internet users’ concerns about and experience of potential online harms’ Ofcom and ICO, May
2019 (last viewed in November 2020)
13 ‘Reclaiming the Internet for Girls’ Plan International (last viewed in November 2020)
14 ‘Online Hate Crime Report 2020’ Galop (last viewed in November 2020)
15 ‘Antisemitic Incidents Report 2019’ Community Security Trust (last viewed in November 2020)
16 ‘Half of children and teens exposed to harmful online content while in lockdown’ BBFC, May 2020
(last viewed in November 2020)
17 ‘Millions of attempts to access child sexual abuse online during lockdown’ Internet Watch
Foundation, 2020 (last viewed in November 2020)
18 ‘Covid-19 news and information: consumption and attitudes - interactive data’ Ofcom, June 2020: 




               
           
        
           
            
              




         
              
        
      
       
             
 
 
            
           
       
 
        
          
      
       
      
      
         
    
 
               
            
         
        
        
 
          
          
  
 
       
         
 
     
   
14. Many of the major social media companies have moved further and faster than ever before
to tackle disinformation and misinformation during the pandemic through technical changes
to their products, including techniques to protect user safety online. However, this is
inconsistent across services. The new regulatory framework will create incentives to ensure
that companies continue to take consistent and transparent action to keep their users safe.
COVID-19 has shone a spotlight on the need to better understand and respond to new and
evolving challenges online, particularly the risks posed to children.
Our response
15. The government’s approach to the governance of digital technologies aims to maximise the
benefits while minimising the risks. Action is being taken in a range of areas - including data
and data use, cyber security, competition, and protecting quality journalistic content - to
improve online safety and security, support dynamic and competitive digital markets, and
to promote our democratic values online. Our approach is proportionate with innovation at
its heart. A future digital strategy will set out how the government is bringing these strands
of work together.
16. The government’s response to online harms is a key part of this overall approach. The
online harms regime will improve users’ safety online, build public trust in digital services,
support innovation and drive digital and economic growth.
17. The online harms framework will be coherent and comprehensive, bringing much needed
clarity to the regulatory landscape and providing support for both industry and users. It will
be proportionate, risk-based and tightly defined in its scope. The legislation will avoid taking
a ‘one size fits all approach’ to companies and harms in scope, to reflect the diversity of
online services and harms. The government has placed particular emphasis on protecting
children,19 ensuring a pro-innovation approach, and protecting freedom of expression
online. Regulation will safeguard pluralism and ensure internet users can continue to
engage in robust debate online.
18. Regulation will be only one part of the solution. The government will support growth and
innovation across the UK’s safety tech sector, creating the right conditions for UK safety
tech companies to deliver cutting edge safety technologies. Users must also be empowered
to think critically about what they encounter online, and online products and services must
be designed from the outset to be safe for users.
Overview of the new regulatory framework for online harms
Which online services will be in scope of the new regulatory framework?
Services in scope and exemptions
19. The new regulatory framework will apply to companies whose services:
(a) host user-generated content which can be accessed by users in the UK; and/or





         
     
         
 
       
         
          
       
     
 
      
            
              
         
       
   
    




           
       
       
        
     
         
         
           
            
            




            
             
        
 
       
 
           
           
             
 
    
 
(b) facilitate public or private online interaction between service users, one or more 
of whom is in the UK.
It will also apply to search engines.
20. The legislation will apply to any in-scope company that provides services to UK users,
regardless of where it is based in the world. Only a small proportion of UK businesses (the
government estimates fewer than 3%)20 will fall within the scope of the legislation following
the new exemptions set out below. Ofcom’s regulatory approach will focus on companies
where the risk of harm is greatest.
21. The initial government response confirmed that business-to-business services would be
out of scope. Services which play a functional role in enabling online activity, such as
internet service providers, will also be exempt from the duty of care, although they will have
duties to cooperate with the regulator on business disruption measures. The government
is introducing additional provisions to exempt many low-risk businesses from the duty of
care altogether. New exemptions include services used internally by businesses, and many
low-risk businesses with limited functionality (for example retailers who offer only product
and service reviews). This avoids imposing regulatory burdens on low-risk companies.
Journalistic content
22. Stakeholders raised concerns during the consultation about how the legislation will impact
journalistic content online and the importance of upholding media freedom. Content
published by a news publisher on its own site (e.g. on a newspaper or broadcaster's
website) will not be in scope of the regulatory framework and user comments on that
content will be exempted.
23. In order to protect media freedom, legislation will include robust protections for journalistic
content shared on in-scope services. The government is committed to defending the
invaluable role of a free media and is clear that online safety measures must do this. The
government will continue to engage with a range of stakeholders to develop our proposals.
What harmful content or activity will the new regulatory framework apply to, and what
action will companies need to take?
Definition of harm
24. The legislation will set out a general definition of harmful content and activity. A limited
number of priority categories of harmful content, posing the greatest risk to users, will be
set out in secondary legislation. This will provide legal certainty for companies and users.
Duty of care and the principles of the regulatory framework
25. Under the new legislative framework, companies in scope will have a duty of care towards
their users. The legislation will require companies to prevent the proliferation of illegal
content and activity online, and ensure that children who use their services are not exposed




          
         
        
 
                  
       
            
              
        




       
            
           
      
 
     
            
             
            
            
         
        
      
         
  
 
   
 
     
           
            
        
         
         
          
      
 
    
        
           
 
                    
    
to harmful content. It will also hold the largest tech companies to account for what they say
they are doing to tackle activity and content that is harmful to adults using their services.
Further details on the approach are set out in paragraphs 27 and 28 below.
26. To meet the duty of care, companies in scope will need to understand the risk of harm to
individuals on their services and put in place appropriate systems and processes to improve
user safety. Ofcom will oversee and enforce companies’ compliance with the duty of care.
Companies and the regulator will need to act in line with a set of guiding principles. These
include improving user safety, protecting children and ensuring proportionality. Further
details are set out in Annex A.
Differentiated expectations on companies
27. The regulatory framework will establish differentiated expectations on companies in scope
with regard to different categories of content and activity on their services: that which is
illegal; that which is harmful to children; and that which is legal when accessed by adults
but which may be harmful to them.
28. The new regulatory framework will take a tiered approach. The vast majority of services will
be ‘Category 2 services’. These companies will need to take proportionate steps to address
relevant illegal content and activity,21 and to protect children. A small group of high-risk,
high-reach services will be designated as ‘Category 1 services’, and only providers of these
services will additionally be required to take action in respect of content or activity on their
services which is legal but harmful to adults. This tiered approach will protect freedom of
expression and mitigate the risk of disproportionate burdens on small businesses. It will
also ensure that companies with the largest online presence are held to account,
addressing the mismatch between companies’ stated safety policies and many users’
experiences online.
Public and private communications channels 
29. The regulatory framework will apply to public communication channels and services where
users expect a greater degree of privacy - for example online instant messaging services
and closed social media groups. Ofcom will set out how companies can fulfil their duty of
care in codes of practice, including what measures are likely to be appropriate in the context
of private communications. This could include steps to make services safer by design, such
as limiting the ability for anonymous adults to contact children. Companies in scope will
need to consider the impact on users' privacy and ensure users understand how company
systems and processes affect user privacy.
30. The scale, severity and complexity of child sexual exploitation and abuse is particularly
concerning, with private channels being exploited by offenders. For example, 12 million of
the 18.4 million worldwide child sexual exploitation and abuse reports made by Facebook
For ease we have referred to illegal content and activity that meets the definition of harm (see paragraph 2.24) as ‘relevant





               
        
        
         
             
          
        
           
     
             




          
                 
        
              
         
         
           
  
 
          
            
      




               
          
         
          
            
            
         




         
       
      
 
   
  
 
in 2019 were for content shared on private channels.22 In light of this, the regulator will have
the power to require companies to use automated technology that is highly accurate to
identify illegal child sexual exploitation and abuse content or activity on their services,
including, where proportionate, on private channels. Recognising the importance of users’
privacy, the government will ensure this will be subject to stringent legal safeguards to
protect users’ rights. The regulator will advise the government on the accuracy of tools and 
make operational decisions regarding whether or not a specific company should be
required to use them. However, before the regulator can use these powers it will need to
seek approval from Ministers on the basis that sufficiently accurate tools exist. The 
regulator will also be able to require companies to use highly accurate technology to identify
illegal terrorist content, also subject to stringent safeguards but on public channels only.
Codes of practice
31. Ofcom will issue codes of practice which outline the systems and processes that companies
need to adopt to fulfil their duty of care. Companies will need to comply with the codes, or
be able to demonstrate to the regulator that an alternative approach is equally effective.
The government will set objectives for the codes in legislation. Ofcom will have a duty to
consult on the codes, and must help all companies to understand and fulfil their
responsibilities. Ofcom must also publish an economic impact assessment for each code
and will have a specific duty to assess the impact of its proposals on small and micro
businesses, to avoid undue regulatory burdens.
32. The government is publishing interim codes on terrorism and child sexual exploitation and
abuse alongside this response, due to the seriousness of these illegal harms. These
voluntary and non-binding interim codes will help companies begin to implement the
necessary changes and bridge the gap until Ofcom issues its statutory codes of practice.
Additional duties on companies
33. All companies in scope will have a number of additional duties beyond the core duty of
care. These include providing mechanisms to allow users to report harmful content or
activity and to appeal the takedown of their content. All companies providing Category 1
services will be required to publish transparency reports containing information about the
steps they are taking to tackle online harms on those services. The Secretary of State for
the Department of Digital, Culture, Media and Sport will have the power to extend the scope
of companies who will be required to publish transparency reports, beyond Category 1
companies, if necessary.
Disinformation and misinformation
34. Disinformation and misinformation that could cause significant harm to an individual will be
within scope of the duty of care. Some types of disinformation and misinformation are likely 
to be proposed in secondary legislation as categories of priority harm that companies must
22 ‘Tech Companies Detect a Surge in Online Videos of Child Sexual Abuse’ The New York Times, 




       
          
      
            
     
        
 
 
           
       
            
          
       
          
 
         
              
        
   
 
   
 
       
               
         
         
     
             
    
  
        
         
               
     
           
            
         
      
  
 
        
         
  
address in their terms and conditions. In addition to the requirements under the duty of
care, the legislation will introduce further provisions to address the evolving threat of
disinformation and misinformation. This will include specific transparency requirements and
the establishment of an expert working group, targeted at building understanding and
driving action to tackle these issues.
How will the independent regulator oversee and enforce the new regulatory framework?
The regulator
35. Ofcom will be named as the independent regulator in the legislation. Ofcom is a well-
established independent regulator with a strong reputation internationally and deep
experience of balancing prevention of harm with freedom of speech considerations. It has
a proven track record of taking evidence-based decisions, which balance robust consumer
protection with the need to ensure the regulatory environment is conducive to economic
growth and innovation. This makes it a strong strategic fit for the role.
36. Ofcom will cover the costs of running the regime from industry fees. Only companies above
a threshold based on global annual revenue will be required to notify and pay the fees. In
practice, this means that a large proportion of in-scope companies will be exempt from
paying a fee.
Functions of the regulator
37. Ofcom will have a range of duties and functions under the framework. Its primary duty will
be to improve the safety of users of online services (and that of non-users who may be
directly affected by others’ use of them). This will include setting codes of practice,
establishing a transparency, trust and accountability framework and requiring all in-scope
companies to have effective and accessible mechanisms for users to report concerns.
Ofcom will also have a legal duty to pay due regard to innovation, which will be underpinned
by a number of non-legislative measures.
38. To ensure the effective implementation of the regime, Ofcom will have robust enforcement
tools to tackle non-compliance, including the power to issue fines of up to £18 million or 
10% of global annual turnover, whichever is the higher. It will be able to consider taking
enforcement action, which may include business disruption measures, against any in-
scope company worldwide that provides services to UK users. The government will reserve
the right to introduce criminal sanctions for senior managers if they fail to comply with the
regulator’s information requests. Ofcom will take a proportionate approach to its
enforcement activity. The government will establish a statutory appeals route that is
accessible to companies.
39. The government will continue to assess the institutional landscape as its digital regulation 





        
 
 
        
         
            
              
        
         
      
 
     
 
       
         
       
            
      
         
        




       
        
         
       
          
      
   
 
             
            
      
           
            






   
 
What part will technology, education and awareness play in the solution?
Technology
40. The White Paper recognised the critical role of technology in improving user safety online,
such as using artificial intelligence to identify harmful content quickly and accurately. The
recent ‘Safer Technology, Safer Users: The UK as a World-Leader in Safety Tech’ report
showed the UK is at the forefront of the rapidly developing safety tech industry, with the
industry seeing an annual 35% growth rate since 2016.23 The government will continue to 
invest in this sector, both to support companies in complying with the regime and to promote
wider economic growth in the UK.
Safety by design, media literacy and engaging with information
41. Encouraging companies to build safer products and services will be key to delivering a
successful regulatory regime. Our proposed safety by design framework will set out clear
principles and practical guidance on how companies can design safer online products and
services. The government, Ofcom and industry will also do more to equip users with the
skills they need to keep themselves and others safe online, starting with the publication of
an online media literacy strategy. This will build on Ofcom’s existing media literacy work.
The government and Ofcom will consider the links between service design and media
literacy as part of this.
Next steps
42. The Online Safety Bill, which will give effect to the regulatory framework outlined in this
document, will be ready in 2021. The government also expects the Law Commission to
produce recommendations concerning the reform of the criminal offences relating to
harmful online communications in early 2021. The Law Commission is currently consulting
on its proposals for updating the criminal law in this area.24 The government will consider,
where appropriate, implementing the Law Commission’s final recommendations through
the Online Safety Bill.
43. As the new regulatory framework will be the first comprehensive approach to tackling online
harms in the world, the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport will
undertake a review of the effectiveness of the regime 2-5 years after entry into force. The
government will produce a report setting out findings from the review and conclusions about
whether changes are necessary, which will then be laid in Parliament. Parliament will have
an opportunity to debate the findings of the report.
23 ‘Safer technology, safer users: The UK as a world-leader in Safety Tech’ UK Government, May
2020 (last viewed in November 2020)
24 ‘Harmful Online Communications: The Criminal Offences’’ Law Commission, September 2020 (last 








    
 
  
   
           
      
 
     
           
          
          
 
               
        
     
    
         
         
       
   
          
       
        
       
     
        
 
    
         
       
       





         
      
          
              
    
 
Part 1: Who will the new regulatory framework apply to?
Summary
Consultation questions covered in Part 1:
❖ Are proposals for the online platforms and services in scope of the regulatory
framework a suitable basis for an effective and proportionate approach?
● The new regulatory framework will apply to companies whose services host user-
generated content or facilitate interaction between users, one or more of whom is
based in the UK, as well as search engines. Services playing a functional role in 
enabling online activity will remain out of scope, as will business-to-business
services.
● Exemptions will be applied where the risk of harm is sufficiently low that any
regulatory requirements would be disproportionate. The government will exempt
services used internally by organisations, services managed by educational
institutions that are already subject to regulatory or inspection frameworks (or similar
processes) that address online harm, email and telephony providers, and services
with limited user functionality. Ofcom will take a risk-based and proportionate
approach to its regulatory activity, focusing on companies whose services pose the
biggest risk of harm.
● The government will put in place safeguards to ensure that media freedom is upheld.
Content and articles produced and published by news services on their own sites do
not constitute user-generated content and therefore fall outside the scope of
legislation. Below-the-line comments on articles on news publishers’ sites will be
explicitly exempted from scope. In order to protect media freedom, legislation will
include robust protections for journalistic content shared on in-scope services.
● The regulatory framework will apply to public communication channels, and services
where users expect a greater degree of privacy, such as online instant messaging
services and closed groups. The regulator will set out how companies can fulfil their
duty of care in codes of practice, including what measures are likely to be appropriate
in the context of private communications.
Services in scope
White Paper: The White Paper set out that the regulatory framework will apply to companies
that provide services or tools that allow, enable or facilitate users to share or discover user-
generated content, or interact with each other online. It noted that regulatory requirements
will need to be flexible, risk-based and proportionate. Search engines will be included in the




       
          
            
   
 
        
     
         
       
 
     
         
        
       
         
            
      
         
 
          
         
  
 
         
        
      
       
         
      
                 
 
            
       
         
          
       
        
         




                   
       
 
 
Consultation responses and stakeholder engagement: There was broad support for the
proposed approach. Many parties expressed a need for clarity around organisations in 
scope. There were calls to exclude business-to-business services due to the lower risk of
harm on those services.
Initial government response: The initial government response confirmed that only a small
proportion of UK businesses (estimated to account to less than 5%) are likely to fall within 
the scope of the regulatory framework. It also confirmed that business-to-business services
will be out of scope of regulation.
Final policy position: The government will be maintaining a broad regulatory scope 
encompassing services that host user generated content and facilitate interaction between
users, as well as search engines. The government also recognises that some businesses
and services present a lower risk than others and that any approach must be proportionate
to the level of risk and companies’ capacity to address harm. Specific exemptions have been
introduced for low-risk services. For example, reviews and comments by users on a
company’s website which relate directly to the company, its products and services, or any
of the content it publishes, will be out of scope.
1.1 As set out in the White Paper, the companies in scope of the regulatory framework will
be defined by the types of services they provide. Companies25 will fall into scope if their
services:
(a) host user-generated content which can be accessed by users in the UK; and/or
(b) facilitate public or private online interaction between service users, one or
more of whom is in the UK.
This covers a broad range of services, including (among others) social media services,
consumer cloud storage sites, video sharing platforms, online forums, dating services, online
instant messaging services, peer-to-peer services, video games which enable interaction
with other users online, and online marketplaces.
1.2 Only companies with direct control over the content and activity on a service will be subject
to the duty of care. This means that business-to-business services will remain outside the
scope of the regulatory framework. It also means that services which play a functional role in
enabling online activity will remain out of scope, including internet service providers, virtual
private networks, browsers, web-hosting companies, content delivery service providers,
device manufacturers, app stores, enterprise private networks and security software.
However, such services will, where appropriate, be legally required to comply with the
regulator as part of any business disruption enforcement measures (see Part 4 for further
details).
In this document the term ‘company’ is used to refer (where appropriate) to all entities providing in-scope services, including
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User-generated content  
Legal definitions of these concepts will be set out in the legislation; however, these will cover: 
Box 1: User-generated content and user interactions 
● digital content (including text, images and audio) produced, promoted, generated or  
shared by users of an online service 
● content may be paid-for or free, time-limited or permanent. It must have the potenti al 
to be accessed, viewed, consumed or shared by people other than the original  
producer, promoter, generator or creator 
User interaction  
● any public or private online interaction between service users with potential to create  
and promote user-generated content  
● interaction may be one-to-one or one-to-many and may involve means other tha n 
text, images and audio 
In both cases, ‘user’ refers to any individual, business or organisation (private or public) that 
puts content on a third-party online service. Users may be members, subscribers or visitors 
to the service, and may generate content or interact directly or through an intermediary, such 
as an automated tool or a bot.  
Search engines will be included in scope of the regulatory framework. Search engines do
not host user-generated content directly or facilitate interaction between users. However, there
is evidence of harm occurring on these services, including facilitating easy access to child 
sexual exploitation and abuse content online. There are clear actions they can take to mitigate
the risk of harm and they will be expected to put in place proportionate systems and processes
to keep their users safe. This could include: removing known child sexual abuse images from
their image search results; identifying keywords used to access illegal content; ensuring
algorithms and predictive searches do not promote relevant illegal content; and protecting
users online by signposting to resources and support. Given the distinct nature of search
engines, legislation and codes of practice will include specific material for them. All regulatory
requirements will be proportionate, and respect the key role of search engines in enabling
access to information online.
1.4 The White Paper consulted on defining private communications, and what regulatory
requirements should apply to them. It also said that companies would not be required to
monitor for illegal content on these services in order to protect user privacy.
1.5 The regulatory framework will apply to both public communication channels and services
where users expect a greater degree of privacy - for example online instant messaging
services and closed social media groups. All companies in scope will be required to fulfil the
duty of care by ensuring that they take reasonably practicable steps to tackle relevant illegal
content, and protect children where they are likely to access their services. The regulator will
set out how companies can fulfil their duty of care in codes of practice, including what
 
 
           
        
           
          
          
    
 





          
        
         
        
      
 
        
    
          
          
        
        
     
   
        
      
        
 
    
 
   
   
  
measures are likely to be appropriate in the context of private communications. This could 
include steps to make services safer by design, such as limiting the ability for anonymous
adults to contact children. The scale, severity and complexity of child sexual exploitation and 
abuse is particularly concerning, with private channels being exploited by offenders. In light of
this, Part 2 sets out the circumstances in which the regulator will have the power to require
companies to use automated technology to identify child sexual exploitation and abuse.
Voluntary best practice guidance for infrastructure service providers
Box 2: The government will produce voluntary best practice guidance for 
infrastructure service providers which is separate from the online harms regime. 
 
● Infrastructure service providers still have a role to play in combatting the most serious 
harms such as child sexual exploitation and abuse.  
 
● For example, Internet Watch Foundation and its Internet Service Provider partners 
blocked 8.8 million attempts to access child sexual abuse content from the UK in a 
month-long period earlier this year,26  and web hosting providers are making tools to 
detect child sexual abuse content available to their customers.2728   
 
● In light of this, the government will produce voluntary best practice guidance for 
infrastructure service providers, setting out where their actions can help identify and 
prevent child sexual exploitation and abuse. This guidance will be separate from the 
online harms regime. 
Exemptions
1.6 Many companies and representative groups expressed concerns through the consultation
about low-risk businesses being captured in scope of the new framework. The COVID-19
pandemic has also placed unprecedented challenges on UK businesses. In response, a
number of services will be exempt from the regulatory requirements. These exemptions apply
to specific services, rather than entire companies. These exemptions are:
(a) Business services. Online services which are used internally by organisations -
such as intranets, customer relationship management systems, enterprise cloud 
storage, productivity tools and enterprise conferencing software - will be excluded
from scope. The risk of harm on these services is low, as the user base is limited
and users tend to be verified and acting in a professional capacity. Organisations
will already have policies in place for protecting users and managing disputes.
Requiring them to comply with the legislation would be a disproportionate
regulatory burden.
(b) Online services managed by educational institutions, where those institutions are 
already subject to sufficient safeguarding duties or expectations. This includes 
platforms used by teachers, students, parents and alumni to communicate and
26 ‘Millions of attempts to access child sexual abuse online during lockdown’ Internet Watch
Foundation, 2020 (last viewed in November 2020)
27 ‘Fighting the harmful content problem’ Microsoft (viewed in November 2020)
28 ‘Announcing the CSAM Scanning Tool, Free for All Cloudflare Customers’ Cloudflare, December




      
         
       
         
       
         




          
            
     
            
      
    
         
     
  
       
          
          
          
      
   
 
          
    
        




          
        
          
           
 
      
    
         
 
 
    
   
 
collaborate. This is to avoid unnecessarily adding to any online safeguarding
regulatory or inspection frameworks (or similar processes) already in place.
(c) Email and telephony. Email communication, voice-only calls and SMS/MMS
remain outside the scope of legislation. It is not clear what intermediary steps
providers could be expected to take to tackle harm on these services before
needing to resort to monitoring communications, so imposing a duty of care would 
be disproportionate.
Low-risk functionality exemption
1.7 The legislation will exempt many low-risk businesses with limited functionality. It will
exempt user comments on digital content provided that they are in relation to content directly
published by a service. This will include reviews and comments on products and services 
directly delivered by a company, as well as ‘below the line comments’ on articles and blogs.
This approach avoids imposing costs on businesses to familiarise themselves with the
legislation when they are unlikely to have to take action to comply with the duty of care, given
the low risk that this functionality poses to most users. It will also help to ensure the protection
of media freedom and freedom of speech.
1.8 The online harms regulatory framework has been designed to reduce the burden on UK
business by focussing on the areas that present the greatest risk of harm. The government
estimates that, overall, fewer than 3% of UK businesses in total will be in regulatory scope
following the new exemptions outlined above.29 Ofcom, as the regulator, will also take a 
deliberately risk-based and proportionate approach to companies in scope, some of whose
services will be low-risk.
1.9 Any exemption creates the potential for harm to be displaced from other services,
particularly as technology and user behaviour evolve. The government will exempt these
functionalities in a way which allows the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and
Sport to bring them into scope, should evidence of the level of risk they pose change.
Journalism
White Paper: The White Paper committed to ensuring protections for freedom of expression
within the regulatory framework. Subsequently, Ministers confirmed that there would be
strong protections for journalistic content. The Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto
2019 reaffirmed the commitment to the protection of media freedom in the legislation30.
Consultation responses and stakeholder engagement: There were calls to exclude 
journalistic content from scope, to protect freedom of expression and avoid negatively 
affecting the public’s ability to access information or undermining quality news’ media.
DCMS Online Harms research (externally commissioned), 2020, publication date tbc.
30 ‘The Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto’ The Conservative and Unionist Party, 2020 (last 





          
             
        
           
         
            
 
 
         
        
      
     
            
            
   
 
            
         
           
         
        
   
 
       
            
           




Final policy position: Content and articles produced and published by news websites on
their own sites, and below-the-line comments published on these sites, will not be in scope
of legislation. In order to protect media freedom, legislation will include robust protections
for journalistic content shared on in-scope services. The government is committed to
defending the invaluable role of a free media and is clear that online safety measures must
do this. The government will continue to engage with a range of stakeholders to develop
these proposals.
1.10 Freedom of expression is at the heart of the regulatory framework and there will be strong 
safeguards to ensure that media freedom is upheld. Content and articles produced and
published by news services on their own sites do not constitute user-generated content and
so are out of scope. The government recognises the importance of below-the-line comments
for enabling reader engagement with the news. User comments below articles on news
publishers’ sites will be explicitly exempted from scope. This will be achieved via the low-risk 
functionality exemption (see above).
1.11 Journalistic content is shared across the internet, on social media, forums and other
websites. Journalists use social media services to report directly to their audiences. This
content is subject to in-scope services’ existing content moderation processes. This can result
in journalistic content being removed for vague reasons, with limited opportunities for appeal.
Media stakeholders have raised concerns that regulation may result in increased takedowns
of journalistic content.
1.12 In order to protect media freedom, legislation will include robust protections for journalistic
content shared on in-scope services. The government will continue to engage with a wide
range of stakeholders to develop proposals that protect the invaluable role of a free media and
ensure that the UK is the safest place in the world to be online.
Advertising
Box 3: Online harms regulation and advertising 
 
1. The online advertising ecosystem is complicated and includes services within and 
also beyond the scope of the online harms regulatory framework. Last year the 
Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport announced a review of the 
way that the online advertising market is regulated in the UK, which is being 
considered through the Online Advertising Programme. This programme of work, 
amongst other areas of focus, is identifying where regulatory gaps may exist and 
ensuring that advertising regulation answers the needs of the changing advertising 
marketplace. It will consider a full range of approaches, including support to help 
regulators meet the challenges posed by new advertising technologies and the 
potential for changes to the regulatory landscape.  
 
2. As part of the Online Advertising Programme, the Department for Digital, Culture, 
Media and Sport will launch a public consultation on measures to enhance how 




build on the call for evidence launched on this subject earlier this year and will 
consider options to enhance the regulation of advertising content and placement 
online. 
 
3. Separately, as part of the government’s new strategy ‘Tackling obesity: empowering 
adults and children to live healthier lives’, the government has committed to 
introducing a watershed ban on the advertising of foods that are high in fat, sugar 
and salt (HFSS) on broadcast TV, as well as further restrictions online. The strategy 
also announced that the government wanted to explore going further online. A 
consultation has been published on how a total HFSS advertising restriction online 
would be introduced, and the response to this and the previous 2019 consultation 
will be published in early 2021, setting out plans in more detail. 
 
4. As the government considers further action on these issues, it will seek to avoid 
duplication between these areas, ahead of future regulatory requirements. 
 
5. Nevertheless, some types of advertising will still fall in scope of the online harms 
regulatory framework. The definition of user-generated content will encompass 
organic and influencer adverts that appear on services in scope of the legislation. 
This includes images or text posted from users’ accounts to promote a product, 
service or brand, and may or may not be paid for. As these are indistinguishable 
from other forms of user-generated content, it is therefore important, for clarity and 
consistency, that online harms safety systems and processes apply to these 
advertising posts. 
 
6. The Advertising Standards Authority will remain responsible for overseeing the 
regulation of advertising.  It will continue to regulate the content of individual adverts 
and advertisers’ compliance with the advertising codes. Policy or political arguments 
- both online and offline - which can be rebutted by rival campaigners as part of the 
normal course of political debate are not regulated and the government does not 
support such regulation. It is a matter for voters to decide whether they consider 
materials to be accurate or not. The laws on defamation and the long-standing 









     
        
 
 
   
         
 
          
 
         
    
      
 
           
      
     
             
           
 
             
          
       
         
          
    
 
            
         
        
           
   
 
          
           
          
         
  
 
         
      
           
        
      
  
 
Part 2: What harmful content or activity will the new regulatory
framework apply to, and what action will companies need to take?
Summary
Consultation questions covered in Part 2:
❖ What further steps could be taken to ensure the regulator will act in a targeted and
proportionate manner?
❖ In developing a definition for private communications, what criteria should be
considered?
❖ What channels or forums that can be considered private should be in scope of the
regulatory framework? What specific requirements might be appropriate to apply to
private channels and forums in order to tackle online harms?
● The legislation will set out a general definition of the harmful content and activity
covered by the duty of care. This will include only content or activity which gives rise 
to a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to individuals, and which has a significant
impact on users or others. A limited number of priority categories of harmful content,
posing the greatest risk to individuals, will be set out in secondary legislation.
● All companies in scope will be required to understand the risk of harm to individuals
on their services, and to put in place appropriate systems and processes to improve 
user safety and monitor their effectiveness. The legislation will not change
companies’ liability for individual items of illegal content that meet the definition of
harm. Instead it will require companies to ensure that their policies and processes
are adequate to protect their users.
● Recognising the importance of freedom of expression, the government will establish
differentiated obligations on companies in scope with regard to different categories
of content and activity. Only a small number of high-risk, high-reach Category 1
services will have to address legal but harmful content and activity accessed by
adults on their services.
● The regulator will issue codes of practice to outline the systems and processes that
companies can adopt to fulfil the duty of care, including what measures are likely to
be appropriate in the context of private communications. The government is
publishing interim codes on terrorism and child exploitation and sexual abuse
alongside this document.
● The duty of care will apply to disinformation and misinformation that could cause
harm to individuals, such as anti-vaccination content. The legislation will introduce
additional provisions targeted at building understanding and driving action to tackle
disinformation and misinformation. These provisions will include an expert working






   
 
             
             
             
     
 
       
         
          
        
 
            
         
            
       
      
 
      
 
    
       
             
                
      
   
 
            
            
          
          
            
  
 
              
            
      
            
           
          
             
       
 
             
        
        
Definition of harm 
White Paper: The White Paper set out an initial list of harms in scope but made clear this
was, by design, neither exhaustive nor fixed. A static list could prevent swift regulatory action
to address new forms and types of online harm. It also set out specific exclusions from scope
where there are existing government initiatives to tackle these harms.
Consultation responses and stakeholder engagement: Stakeholders wanted more detail
on the breadth of both services and harms in scope. There were calls to protect freedom of
expression and a focus on protecting children. Some suggested that further work should be
done to increase education and public awareness of online harms.
Final policy position: The legislation will set out a general definition of the harmful content
and activity in scope of the regime. A limited number of priority categories of harmful content
will be set out in secondary legislation. Some categories of harmful content will be explicitly
excluded, to avoid regulatory duplication. This will provide legal certainty for companies and
users and prioritise action on the biggest threats of harm.
Harmful content and activity covered by the duty of care
2.1 The regulatory framework will require companies to have effective systems and processes
in place to improve user safety. The response to the consultation flagged concerns about the
broad range of potential harms in scope of the regime and called for greater clarity. The
legislation will set out a general definition of the harmful content and activity in scope. This will
help provide legal certainty for companies and users and set a clearly defined statutory remit
for Ofcom.
2.2 The legislation will set out that online content and activity should be considered harmful,
and therefore in scope of the regime, where it gives rise to a reasonably foreseeable risk of a
significant adverse physical or psychological impact on individuals. Companies will not have
to address content or activity which does not pose a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm, or
which has a minor impact on users or others. Harms to organisations will not be in scope of
the regime.
2.3 A limited number of priority categories of harmful content, posing the greatest risk to users,
will be set out in secondary legislation. These will cover (i) priority categories of criminal
offences (including child sexual exploitation and abuse, terrorism, hate crime and sale of illegal
drugs and weapons) (ii) priority categories of harmful content and activity affecting children,
such as pornography or violent content, and (iii) priority categories of harmful content and
activity that is legal when accessed by adults, but which may be harmful to them, such as
abuse and content about eating disorders, self-harm or suicide. Further information on the
approach, and the expectations on companies, is set out below.
2.4 In line with the position set out in the White Paper, a number of harms will be excluded
from scope where there are existing legislative, regulatory and other governmental initiatives





         
       
     
         
       
 
         
           
   
 
 
    
   
● Harms resulting from breaches of intellectual property rights;
● Harms resulting from breaches of data protection legislation;
● Harms resulting from fraud;
● Harms resulting from breaches of consumer protection law;
● Harms resulting from cyber security breaches or hacking.
The online harms regulatory framework will not aim to tackle harm occurring through the dark
web.31 A law enforcement response to tackle criminal activity on the dark web is more suitable
than a regulatory approach.
Box 4: Online Fraud and Sale of Unsafe Goods  
White Paper: The White Paper did not set out a definitive position on whether economic 
and financial harms to individuals, including online fraud and sale of unsafe goods, would 
be in scope of the new regulatory framework. 
Consultation responses and stakeholder engagement: A number of organisations 
suggested that economic harms (for instance, online fraud) should be in scope, noting that 
such activity could also lead to significant psychological harm. Others argued that the scope 
of the regulatory framework was too broad, and that any further extension would pose 
disproportionate regulatory burdens on businesses. 
Final policy position: The government is deeply concerned by the growth, impact and  
scale of online fraud, recognising the devastating harm these types of fraud can cause.The 
government has determined that the fraud threat will be most effectively tackled by other 
mechanisms and as such the legislation will not require companies to tackle online fraud. 
We are working closely with industry, regulators and consumer groups to consider additional 
legislative and non-legislative solutions. This ongoing programme of work aims to effectively 
address the harms posed by all elements of online fraud in a cohesive and robust way. This 
includes work on the Online Advertising Programme, led by the Department for Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport, which will be considering further regulation of online advertising 
to reduce online harms, including fraud. 
As noted elsewhere, most forms of advertising, fake websites and data and cyber-security 
breaches are not in scope of the online harms regulatory framework. This would have limited 
the impact the regulatory framework would have had on tackling fraud if it were in scope. 
The government is committed to tackling the sale of unsafe consumer products. The Office 
for Product Safety and Standards has a clear remit for consumer product safety, including 
products sold online. In order to avoid regulatory duplication the sale of unsafe products will 
be excluded from the online harms regulatory framework.  
31 The dark web is made up of a number of untraceable online websites. Specific software and search 





     
 
         
          
        
         
      
  
 
    
        
          
      
         
     
        
    
 
           
           
       
      
 
          
             
  
 
     
 
          
          
          
              
        
 
   
 
             
         
             
       
   
 
Duty of care and principles of the regulatory framework
White Paper: The White Paper stated that there would be a new statutory duty of care to
make companies take more responsibility for the safety of their users. This duty would be
risk-based and proportionate and focused on systems and processes, not individual pieces 
of content. Important principles would apply to the regulatory framework including users’
rights to freedom of expression and privacy, innovation and protecting small and medium-
sized enterprises.
Consultation responses and stakeholder engagement: Many stakeholders welcomed
the approach, noting that this would underpin an effective, future-proofed framework.
Nevertheless, industry responses sought greater reassurance and certainty about how it
would be proportionate in practice, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises; and
how flexibility would be balanced with certainty about what the duty of care requires of
companies. Rights groups and industry also emphasised the need to provide more certainty 
about how safety would be balanced with freedom of expression, particularly in relation to 
legal but harmful content.
Final policy position: In order to provide more clarity and target effectiveness, the duty of
care has been refined. It will cover content and activity that could cause harm to individuals.
The legislation will also introduce additional provisions targeted at building understanding
and driving action to tackle disinformation and misinformation.
2.5 The primary purpose of the duty of care will be to improve safety for users of online
services, and to prevent other people from being harmed as a direct consequence of content
or activity on those services.
How the duty of care works
2.6 The duty of care consists of two parts. The first part relates to the duties on companies
and the second part relates to the regulator’s duties and functions. Companies and the
regulator will be required to carry out their responsibilities under the framework in line with a
range of guiding principles (not all will apply to both). Further details on how the regulatory
framework will be delivered against the guiding principles are set out in Annex A. 
Duties on companies in scope
2.7 The primary responsibility for each company in scope will be to take action to prevent
user-generated content or activity on their services causing significant physical or
psychological harm to individuals. To do this they will complete an assessment of the risks





            
         
             
        
 
         
             
        
          
      
 
       
           
         
              
         
     
         
 
           
               
          
           
       
 
   
            
      
        
          
     
         
          
          
          
 
           
        
           
         
       
 
          
        
          
     
      
      
2.8 The steps a company needs to take will depend, for example, on the risk and severity of
harm occurring, the number, age and profile of their users and the company’s size. Search
engines will need to assess the risk of harm occurring across their entire service. Ofcom will
provide guidance specific to search engines regarding regulatory expectations.
2.9 Companies will fulfil their duty of care by putting in place systems and processes that
improve user safety on their services. These systems and processes will include, for example,
user tools, content moderation and recommendation procedures. The proposed safety by
design framework (detailed in Part 5) will support companies to understand how they can
improve user safety through safer service and product design choices.
2.10 Robust protections for freedom of expression have been built into the design of duties on
companies. Companies will be required to consider users’ rights, including freedom of
expression online, both as part of their risk assessments and when they make decisions on
what safety systems and processes to put in place on their services. Regulation will ensure
transparent and consistent application of companies’ terms and conditions relating to harmful
content. This will both empower adult users to keep themselves safe online, and protect
freedom of expression by preventing companies from arbitrarily removing content.
2.11 The regulatory framework will improve user safety online but it will not eliminate harm or
the risk of harm entirely. Users must be able to report harm when it does occur and seek
redress. They must also be able to challenge wrongful takedown and raise concerns about
companies’ compliance with their duties. This is essential to improving users’ safety, and to
help companies understand the risk and incidence of harm on their services. 
2.12 All companies in scope will have a specific legal duty to have effective and accessible 
reporting and redress mechanisms. This will cover harmful content and activity, infringement
of rights (such as over-takedown), or broader concerns about a company’s compliance with
its regulatory duties. Ofcom’s codes of practice will set out expectations for these mechanisms.
The government expects the codes to cover areas such as accessibility (including to children),
transparency, communication with users, signposting and appeals. Expectations on
companies will be risk-based and proportionate, and will correspond to the types of content
and activity which different services are required to address. For example, the smallest and
lowest risk companies might need to give only a contact email address, while larger companies
offering higher-risk functionalities will be expected to provide a fuller suite of measures.
2.13 The government will not mandate specific forms of redress, and companies will not be
required to provide financial compensation to users (other than in accordance with any existing
legal liability). Forms of redress offered by companies could include: content removal;
sanctions against offending users; reversal of wrongful content removal or sanctions; 
mediation; or changes to company processes and policies.
2.14 The regulatory framework will not establish new avenues for individuals to sue
companies. However, the existing legal rights individuals have to bring actions against
companies will not be affected. As outlined in the White Paper, the government expects legal
action to become more accessible to users as the evidence base around online harms grows,
and as regulatory precedent is established. Users will be able to use regulatory decisions that












              
             
           
          
         
       
Box 5: Service design and the risk of online harms 
● The design of a service and its features can be one of the factors that contributes to  
the risk of harm occurring to a user. For example, a service is likely to be higher risk  
if it has features such as: allowing children to be contacted by unknown adult user s; 
allowing all users  - including children -  to live-stream themselves; and including  
private messaging channels where the content on those private channels is not o r 
cannot be moderated. A lower risk service might include features such as: the ability 
to moderate all content; having public messaging forums with text content only; an d 
taking steps to ensure an age appropriate environment for children, for example  by 
restricting contact of children by unknown users.  
 
● As part of their duty of care, companies in scope will be expected to consider, as 
part of their regular risk assessments, the risk of online harms posed by their service , 
including the risk presented by the design of their service and its feature s. 
Companies will be expected to reassess the risk of online harms if they are planni ng 
significant changes to their services. 
 
● Following the risk assessment, companies will be required to take steps to addres s
the risks they have identified. This will be key to them fulfilling their duty of care to  
their users and delivering a higher level of protection for children. 
● The regulator will set out the steps that companies should take to address the ri sk 
posed by their services, and ultimately will have the power to assess whether the  
steps taken are sufficient to fulfil the company’s regulatory requirements. Failure t o 
fulfil the duty of care may result in the regulator taking robust enforcement action. 
   
● The decisions taken by a company on the design or functionality of their service will  
not exempt them from needing to comply with other regulatory requirements. For  
example, all companies in scope must comply with information requests from t he 
regulator. In tightly prescribed circumstances, and subject to stringent legal  
safeguards, the regulator will be able to require the use of highly accurate technology 
to identify specific categories of illegal child sexual abuse or terrorist content an d 
activity. As with all regulatory requirements, the onus will be on the company to  
comply with these requirements. 
Differentiated expectations on companies
White Paper: The White Paper set out that all services in scope will be required to address
illegal and legal but harmful content and activity. It stated that the regulatory approach would 
impose more specific and stringent requirements for illegal harms than for content and
activity which are legal but have the potential to cause harm, depending on the context. It
acknowledged that the impact of harmful content and activity can be particularly damaging





   
             
          
      
          
   
 
        
         
         
            
 
             
           
       
 
         
        
          
           
    
 
             
  
           
              
      
           
         
     
           
        
         
     




          
          
            
        
         
        
      
 
Consultation responses and stakeholder engagement: The consultation responses
flagged concerns about the broad scope of harms, calling for greater clarity and highlighting
the subjectivity inherent in identifying many of the harms, especially those which are legal.
Many respondents objected to the latter being in scope. There were concerns that proposals
could impact freedom of expression online. Respondents to the consultation welcomed the
approach to the protection of children.
Final policy position: The initial government response developed the original position,
confirming a differentiated approach for illegal content and activity versus content that is 
legal but harmful. Only companies providing Category 1 services will have to take action in
respect of adult users accessing legal but harmful content on their services.
All companies in scope will be expected to assess whether children are likely to access their
services, and if so, take measures to protect children on their services including reasonable 
steps to prevent them from accessing age-inappropriate and harmful content.
2.15 The regulatory framework will establish differentiated expectations on companies in 
scope with regard to different types of content and activity. This will ensure companies
prioritise tackling relevant illegal content and activity on their services, and that children are
protected from age-inappropriate and harmful content online. The differentiated approach can
be summarised as follows:
● All companies will be required to take action with regard to relevant illegal content and
activity.
● All companies will be required to assess the likelihood of children accessing their
services. If they assess that children are likely to access their services, they will be
required to provide additional protections for children using them.
● Only companies with Category 1 services will be required to take action with regard to
legal but harmful content and activity accessed by adults. This is because services
offering extensive functions for sharing content and interacting with large numbers of
users pose a significantly increased risk of harm from legal but harmful content. The
approach will protect freedom of expression and mitigate the risk of disproportionate
burdens on small businesses. It will also address the current mismatch between
companies’ stated safety policies and many users’ experiences online which, due to 
their scale, is a particular challenge on the largest social media services.
Designating Category 1 services
2.16 Category 1 services will be determined through a three-step process. First, the primary
legislation will set out high level factors which lead to significant risk of harm occurring to
adults through legal but harmful content. These factors will be: the size of a service’s 
audience (because harm is more likely to occur on services with larger user bases, for
example due to rapid spread of content and ‘pile-on’ abuse); and the functionalities it offers
(because certain functionalities, such as the ability to share content widely or contact users




         
         
           
        
 
            
       
         
       
             
            
           
        
  
 
   
 
           
          
            
 
            
           
            
     
           
          
            
          
 
             
       
       
        
          
            
        
 
          
          
         
 
           
         
        
         
 
2.17 Second, the government will determine and publish thresholds for each of the factors.
Ofcom will be required to provide non-binding advice to the government on where these
thresholds should be set. The final decision on thresholds will lie with the government, to
ensure democratic oversight of the scope of the regulatory framework.
2.18 Ofcom will then be required to assess services against these thresholds and publish a
register of all those which meet both thresholds. These services will be designated as
Category 1 services and be required to take action against legal but harmful content accessed
by adults. Ofcom will be able to add services to the list of Category 1 services if they reach
the thresholds, and to remove services if they no longer meet the thresholds. If a company
believes its service has wrongly been designated as Category 1, then it will be able to appeal
to an appropriate tribunal (further detail on Appeals is set out in Part 4). Ofcom will also be
able to provide advice to the government if it considers a change to the thresholds to be
necessary.
Illegal content and activity
2.19 All companies in scope will need to take action to prevent the use of their services for
criminal activity. They will need to ensure that illegal content is removed expeditiously and that
the risk of it appearing and spreading across their services is minimised by effective systems.
2.20 The government will set priority categories of offences in secondary legislation, against
which companies will be required to take particularly robust action. These will be offences
posing the greatest risk of harm, taking account of the number of people likely to be affected
and how severely they might be harmed. Examples of priority categories of offences include
child sexual exploitation and abuse and terrorism. The identification of priority categories of
offences will focus companies’, and the regulator’s, efforts on the most harmful issues.
Companies will still be required to tackle other relevant illegal material on their services, where
this is identified through their systems or where it is reported to them.
2.21 For priority categories of offences, companies will need to consider, based on a risk
assessment, what systems and processes are necessary to identify, assess and address such
offences (for example devoting more resources to content moderation or limiting algorithmic
promotion of content). Recognising the severity of child sexual exploitation and abuse and
terrorism, companies may be required to proactively identify and block or remove this type of
illegal material if other steps have not been effective and safeguards are in place. Further
details are set out later on in Part 2.
2.22 All companies in scope must additionally take steps to minimise the risk of other relevant
illegal content and activity occurring on their services. This will require putting in place effective
user reporting and redress mechanisms for dealing with such illegal content and activity.
2.23 Companies may already be liable for illegal content and activity on their services. Under
existing law, they may be liable for such content if they have been notified of its existence,
have subsequently failed to remove it in good time, and the hosting of such content gives rise




         
               
           
             
      
 
       
 
      
        
        
          
      
           
         
      
            
  
 
       
         
         
          
 
 
            
             
         
          
          
2.24 The regulatory framework will require companies to address illegal content and activity
which could constitute a UK criminal offence or an element of a UK criminal offence and which
meets the definition of harm, as set out above. It will not cover online material which only gives 
rise to a risk of civil liability (e.g. negligence or defamation). Some areas of criminal law will be
excluded, as set out above in paragraph 2.4.
Freedom of expression and relevant illegal material
2.25 To avoid companies taking an overly risk-averse approach to the identification and
removal of material likely to be illegal, the regulatory framework will enshrine strong
safeguards for freedom of expression. Further details are included in Annex A. Companies
will be required to consider the impact on and safeguards for users’ rights when designing and 
deploying content moderation systems and processes. This might involve engaging with
stakeholders in the development of their content moderation policies, considering the use of
appropriate automated tools, and ensuring appropriate training for human moderators.
Companies should also take reasonable steps to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of
their systems, including considering the amount of legitimate content that was incorrectly
removed.
2.26 The regulatory framework will also require companies to give users a right to challenge
content removal, as an important protection for freedom of expression. Certain companies will
also need to produce transparency reports, which are likely to include information about their
measures to uphold freedom of expression and privacy (see Part 4 for more information on
transparency).
2.27 The online harms regime will not change companies’ liability for individual items of illegal
content that meet the definition of harm. Instead it will require companies to ensure that their
policies and processes are adequate to protect their users. Where moderation procedures
meet the above objectives, individual instances of illegal content or activity appearing on a 
company's services will not necessarily mean it has failed to fulfil the duty of care.
31
 
Box 6: Taking, making and sharing intimate images without consent 
 
● The evolution of technology has made it easier for users to create images to send to 
friends, family or post en masse to the public. It also means that it is easier to 
distribute images of individuals without consent. This is particularly harmful when 
those images are ‘intimate’ in nature, such as revenge and deepfake pornography. 
 
● Currently, there is no single criminal offence in England and Wales that captures t he 
taking, making and sharing of intimate images without consent. Instead, we have  a 
range of offences that have developed over time, some of which existed before the  
rise of the internet and use of smartphones. 
 
● To ensure that legislation provides victims with the right support and protection from  
these harmful behaviours, the Ministry of Justice has sponsored the Law  
Commission to review the law around the taking, making and sharing of non-
consensual intimate images. The Law Commission has not yet issued its draft  




        
              
          
            
           
       
         
           
           
           
         
             
            
           
          
            
      
            
   
 
         
           
          
  
 
        
     
           
         
       
       
           
         
   
 
 
           
              
 
    
   
government will consider taking forward the proposals, where appropriate, in a 
legislative vehicle.  
 
● All companies in scope of the duty of care will be required to take action against 
illegal content and activity, including intimate image abuse.   
Legal but harmful content and activity accessed by adults
2.28 Only companies providing Category 1 services will be expected to take steps in respect
of legal but harmful content and activity that is accessed by adults. The legislation will not
require the removal of specific pieces of legal content. Companies must consider the impacts
of their decisions regarding moderation and design choices on user safety. The approach will
ensure transparent and consistent application of companies’ terms and conditions relating to
harmful content. This will both empower adult users to keep themselves safe online and
protect freedom of expression, by preventing companies from arbitrarily removing content.
2.29 The government will set out priority categories of legal but harmful material in secondary
legislation (e.g. content promoting self-harm, hate content, online abuse that does not meet
the threshold of a criminal offence, and content encouraging or promoting eating disorders).
Ofcom will be required to provide non-binding advice to the government on what should be
included in that secondary legislation. Categories of legal but harmful material must meet the
definition of harmful content and activity described in paragraph 2.2. This approach will ensure
that the regulatory framework provides sufficient clarity for businesses, users and the regulator
about the categories of legal but harmful material that these companies should, at a minimum,
address through their terms and conditions.
Box 7: Material that, of itself, may not be illegal but is linked to child sexual
exploitation and abuse online
● The government remains committed to taking action against material that may not
be illegal, but is linked to child sexual exploitation and abuse online. Such material
can have a devastating impact on victims, contributing to their re-traumatisation and
facilitating further offences. 
● The government has engaged extensively with tech companies on the importance
of responding to this content. In March 2020, the Voluntary Principles to Counter 
Online Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse were launched, endorsed by a range of
tech companies and the UK, US, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand 
governments.32 These recognise the importance of taking appropriate action on
certain images, videos, discussions and other material which may fall below the
threshold of illegal but still warrant action. The government will continue to explore
regulatory and legal options to ensure companies are taking effective and consistent
action to tackle this content.
2.30 Companies providing Category 1 services will be required to undertake regular risk
assessments to identify legal but harmful material on these services, covering both the priority
32 ‘Voluntary Principles to Counter Online Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse’ Five Country




       
       
          
              
        
 
         
        
       
              
           
            
             
           
 
          
        
         
        
        
       
         
 
    
        
         
            
            
     
        
        
 
            
        
          
          
      
       
         
    
 
    
 
       
            
        
 
categories set out in secondary legislation and any other types of harm present or at risk of
arising. Risk assessments should consider the risk to adult users, including vulnerable users.
Companies providing Category 1 services will use the definition of harmful material in
paragraph 2.2 to identify and notify the regulator of emerging legal but harmful harms. The
regulator’s codes of practice will include information on the risk assessment process.
2.31 These companies will be required to set clear and accessible terms and conditions which 
explicitly state how they will handle the priority categories of legal but harmful material
established in legislation, and any others identified by them through their risk assessment.
They will need to make clear to users what is acceptable on their services for such content,
and how it will be treated across their services. Companies will be expected to consult with
civil society and expert groups when developing their terms and conditions. This will
encourage the adoption of terms and conditions that meet user needs and build on existing
best practice on how to effectively tackle different types of harmful content and activity.
2.32 These terms and conditions must be enforced consistently and transparently, irrespective
of what the company’s policy is. This will include having effective and accessible reporting and
redress mechanisms, with the regulator's codes of practice setting out the steps which
companies can take to meet expectations. Terms and conditions will not simply be about
accepting or removing content. They could include, for example, circumstances in which
content has a label applied to it, or is de-prioritised. They could also include circumstances in 
which users are signposted towards support, or nudged in order to discourage behaviour.
2.33 This approach will empower adult users to keep themselves safe online, while ensuring
that the legislation will not require companies providing Category 1 services to remove specific
pieces of legal content unless specified as not permitted by their terms and conditions. It will
be particularly beneficial for vulnerable adults and those disproportionately affected by online
harms, including groups with protected characteristics or those with particular mental or
physical health conditions, as they are currently more likely to experience harm associated
with such content or activity online. It will also ensure companies providing Category 1 services
are accountable for their public commitments in their terms and conditions.
2.34 This approach recognises the importance of high risk, high reach platforms as public
forums where people can engage in robust debate online. Companies will not be able to
arbitrarily remove controversial viewpoints and users will be able to seek redress if they feel
content has been removed unfairly. When combined with transparency requirements (see Part
4), the duty to consistently apply terms and conditions will also increase understanding about
what content is taken down and why. In this way, regulation will promote and safeguard
pluralism online, while ensuring companies can be held to account for their commitments to
uphold freedom of expression.
Box 8: Safety by design
● The White Paper recognised that companies themselves have a crucial role to play
in tackling the proliferation of online harms. The design of an online product or




     
          
         
       
            
  
 
            
     
             
      
 
         
         
       
          
        
     
  
 
   
 
        
           
      
   
 
        
         
         
  
 
      
    
          
 
        
           
        
         
 
           
      




● The government’s forthcoming safety by design framework will set out what ‘good’
looks like for safe product and service design. The framework will be open source
and developed with industry, subject and technical experts. It will contain clear
principles and practical guidance for product designers, managers and developers 
on how to build safer online products and services from the outset. Further details 
are in Part 5.
● The safety by design framework will be an important step in ensuring that all
companies, especially small businesses, are equipped with the know-how to
effectively embed safety into the design of their online products and services, to help
minimise regulatory burdens and support fulfilment of the duty of care.
● Device security also has an important role in user safety. In January 2020, the
Minister for Digital Infrastructure announced that the government would be
developing legislation to protect citizens and the wider economy from the harms that
can arise from 'smart', Internet of Things (IoT) or 'internet-connected' devices that
lack important cyber-security measures. This work is underway with a view to 
introducing legislation as soon as parliamentary time becomes available.
Box 9: Anonymous Abuse
● As set out in the White Paper, anonymous abuse can have a significant impact on
victims, whether members of the public or high-profile public figures. It is important
that the regulatory framework adequately addresses this issue, whilst protecting
freedom of expression.
● Anonymous abuse has been on the rise. In a sample of 4.2 million tweets collected
during the 2019 General Election campaign, abusive replies sent to candidates were
found in nearly 4.5% of all replies, compared to just under 3.3% in the 2017 General
Election.33 
● The consultation did not specifically cover anonymous abuse but respondents put
forward arguments both for and against preserving online anonymity, particularly in
regard to protecting the identity of those individuals who flag harmful content.
● The regulatory framework will address abuse online, including anonymous abuse,
whilst protecting freedom of expression and the legitimate use of anonymity online
by groups such as human rights advocates, whistleblowers and survivors of abuse.
The legislation will, therefore, not put any new limits on online anonymity.
● Under the duty of care, all companies in scope will be expected to address
anonymous online abuse that is illegal through effective systems and processes.
Where companies providing Category 1 services prohibit legal but harmful online
33 ‘Online Abuse toward Candidates during the UK General Election 2019: Working Paper’ Gorell and 




            
    
    
 
        
        
        
         
           
       
 
           
        
    
           
       
   
 
       
       
        
     
 
            
       
       
    
 
            
          
          
        
 
       
           
       
         
    
 
        
          
         
     
    
 
   
 
abuse, they will need to ensure their terms and conditions are clear about how this 
applies to abuse perpetrated anonymously. They will then need to enforce these
terms and conditions consistently and transparently.
● Being anonymous online does not give anyone the right to abuse others. The police 
have a range of legal powers to identify individuals who attempt to use anonymity to
escape sanctions for online abuse, where the activity is illegal. The government is
continuing to review with law enforcement whether the current powers are sufficient
to tackle illegal anonymous abuse online. The outcome of that work will inform the
government’s future position in relation to illegal anonymous abuse online.
● The government recognises that in the context of online abuse, the line between
illegal and legal behaviour is not well understood. The Law Commission has 
reviewed the legal framework relating to abusive and offensive communications 
online. They are now consulting on their provisional proposals, which aim to improve
the existing communications offences, ensuring the law is clearer and more 
effectively targets serious harm online.34 
● As highlighted in their consultation, the Commission acknowledges that anonymity
online often facilitates and encourages abusive behaviours. Combined with an online
disinhibition effect, abusive behaviours, such as pile-on harassment, are much easier 
to engage in on a practical level.
● To deal with such abusive behaviours online, the Commission has put forward
several recommendations. These include replacing existing offences with new laws 
which more effectively criminalise online behaviours likely to cause harm. These
proposals are subject to consultation.
● The Law Commission is expected to provide its recommendations for reform of the
criminal law in this area in early 2021. Once the final recommendations have been
published the government will consider, where appropriate, whether to bring these
recommendations into law as part of the Online Safety Bill.
● Intimidation and abuse in public life can also stop talented individuals, particularly
women and those from minority backgrounds, from standing for public office, or
undertaking high profile roles such as journalism. Journalists are often subject to
online abuse and harassment, which can undermine their ability to carry out their
vital democratic function.
● The government is therefore taking forward a co-ordinated programme of work to 
safeguard the integrity and security of our democratic processes. Under the
Defending Democracy programme, a key priority is tackling the intimidation of
elected officials by strengthening our legislative framework, driving policy across 
government, and engaging with partners.
34 ‘Harmful Online Communications: The Criminal Offences’’ Law Commission, September 2020 (last 





        
         
       
  
 
            
         
        
       
         
 
 
       
 
       
            
           
          
 
              
          
            
        
        
        
          
        
 
              
        
       
       
          
      
              
         
             
       
       
         
      
    
 
            
       
        
● We are also encouraging respect for open, fair and safe democratic participation for
voters and candidates by implementing the recommendations set out in the
government’s response to the Committee on Standards in Public Life report on
Intimidation in Public Life.
● The government has committed to introduce a new sanction of intimidation against
candidates or campaigners, either in person or online. The new electoral sanction is 
being developed to crack down on the intimidation and abuse being suffered by those
at the forefront of public service. The government has also committed to the
development of a National Action Plan for the Safety of Journalists.
Content and activity that is legal but harmful to children
2.35 The online harms regime will ensure the most comprehensive approach possible to
protecting children. It will deliver the objectives of Part 3 of the Digital Economy Act, to protect
children from accessing online pornography, and go further to protect children from a broader
range of harmful and age-inappropriate content on all services in scope.
2.36 The framework will deliver a higher level of protection for children than for adults. All
companies in scope will be required to assess the likelihood of children accessing their
services. Only services which are likely to be accessed by children will be required to provide
additional protections for children using them. This is the approach taken in the Information
Commissioner’s Age Appropriate Design Code, which requires companies to apply the Code’s
standards for protecting children’s personal data where they have assessed that children are
‘likely to access’ their service. This will provide consistency for companies who may be
required to comply with both the Age Appropriate Design Code and the duty of care.
2.37 Companies which have assessed their service as likely to be accessed by children will
be required to conduct a child safety risk assessment of their service specifically for children,
identify and implement proportionate mitigations to protect children, and monitor these for
effectiveness. Companies will be required to undertake regular child safety risk assessments
to identify legal but harmful material on their services impacting children, covering both the
priority categories set out in secondary legislation (as detailed in paragraph 2.38 below) and
any other types of harm present or at risk of arising to children. These companies will also be
required to assess the risks that material on their services poses to children of different ages
and to put in place age-appropriate protective measures. The regulator will be required to have
regard to the fact that children have different needs at different ages when preparing codes of
practice relevant to the protection of children. The regulator’s codes of practice will include
guidance on the risk assessment process. Companies will also need to put in place effective 
and accessible user reporting and redress mechanisms for content and activity which is
harmful to children.
2.38 In addition to the approach for priority categories for illegal material and legal but harmful
material accessed by adults described above, the government will also set out in secondary




            
         
            
    
           
     
 
         
           
     
            
       
          
        
  
 
          
            
        
         
 
       
     
         
          
    
 
     
            
           
        
         
      
 
          
       
          
            
    
         
    
 
         
       
         
         
       
regulator will be required to provide non-binding advice to the government on what should be
included in those categories. Categories of legal but harmful material impacting children must
meet the definition of harmful content and activity described in paragraph 2.2. This approach
will ensure that the regulatory framework provides sufficient clarity for businesses, users and 
the regulator about the categories of legal but harmful material impacting children that
companies in scope should, at a minimum, take action on.
2.39 Companies with services likely to be accessed by children will need to make clear what
is acceptable on their services for legal but harmful material as described above for adults.
The regulator will determine appropriate levels of risk-based and proportionate protection for
children and set out through its codes of practice the steps companies need to take. This is
expected to cover legal but harmful content and activity such as cyberbullying, and access to
age-inappropriate content such as online pornography. Specific measures required to address
illegal harms such as child sexual exploitation and abuse are covered above in paragraphs 
2.19 to 2.24.
2.40 The regulator will focus on ensuring that companies whose services are likely to be
accessed by children have good systems and processes in place to protect children. This
includes providing terms and conditions and user redress mechanisms that are suitable for
children as well as more transparency about how services are providing greater protection.
2.41 Under our proposals companies will be expected to use a range of tools proportionately,
to take reasonable steps to prevent children from accessing age-inappropriate content and to
protect them from other harms. This includes, for example, the use of age assurance and age
verification technologies, which are expected to play a key role for companies in order to fulfil
their duty of care.
2.42 The government would not in every case expect age assurance technologies to be used
to block children from content or services, but where appropriate, to protect children within a
service and enhance a child user's experience by tailoring safety features to the age of the
user. For example, the Lego Life app requires parental consent to unlock features and
functions, to provide an age-appropriate service. The proposed safety by design framework
will also reflect these design objectives in its guidance.
2.43 Although the government will not be mandating the use of specific technological
approaches through the legislation to prevent children from accessing age-inappropriate
content and to protect them from other harms, the government does expect that the regulatory
framework will drive innovation and take-up of age assurance and, where appropriate, age
verification technologies. The government is working closely with stakeholders across industry
to establish the right conditions for the market to deliver these technical solutions ahead of the
legislative requirements coming into force.
2.44 Technical standards also have an important role to play in tackling online harms. In line
with this approach, the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport is supporting the
update of Publicly Available Standard 1296: 2018 ‘online age checking’. The Department for
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport recognises the benefit PAS 1296 brings to the age assurance




       
     
 
         
       
          
           
    
 
       
 
           
     
          
       
           
        
         
      
 
                
   
     
          
    
      
           
      
           
         
        
 
          
      
       
       
   
 
          
   
            
          
      
    
 
 
   
closely with the British Standards Institute and other relevant stakeholders to bring the
standard in line with current policy and industry needs.
2.45 In keeping with its existing priorities in broadcasting, the government expects Ofcom to 
prioritise children in its approach to enforcement in accordance with the principle of delivering
a higher level of protection to children. In its enforcement guidelines, Ofcom will be required
to set out how it will take into account any impact on children due to a company’s failure to
fulfil its duty of care.
Box 10: Online Harms and the Digital Economy Act
● In October 2019 the government announced that it would deliver the objective of
protecting children online through the online harms regulatory framework instead of
Part 3 of the Digital Economy Act 2017. The government has carefully reviewed how
to ensure the objectives of the Digital Economy Act will be delivered by the
framework. Through the regulatory framework, the government will go further to
protect children from a broader range of harmful and age-inappropriate content,
across a wider range of sites in scope, going beyond the Digital Economy Act’s focus
on online pornography on commercial adult sites.
● One of the criticisms of the Digital Economy Act was that its scope did not cover
social media companies where a considerable quantity of pornographic material is 
accessible to children. The government’s new approach will include social media 
companies and sites where user-generated content can be widely shared, including
commercial pornography sites. Where pornography sites have such functionalities 
(including video and image sharing, commenting and live streaming) they will be
subject to the duty of care. The online harms regime will capture both the most visited
pornography sites and pornography on social media, therefore covering the vast
majority of sites where children are exposed to pornography. Taken together we
expect this to bring into scope more online pornography that children can currently 
access than the narrower scope of the Digital Economy Act.
● The regulator will determine appropriate levels of risk-based and proportionate
protection for children. Companies in scope which are likely to be accessed by
children will need to put in place measures to keep children safe from harmful activity
and prevent them from accessing age-inappropriate or harmful content, including
online pornography.
● The online harms legislation will not mandate the use of specific technological
approaches to prevent children from accessing age-inappropriate content and to 
protect them from other harms. However, the government expects the regulator will
take a robust approach to sites that pose the highest risk of harm to children,
including sites hosting online pornography. This may include recommending the use
of age assurance or verification technologies.





    
           
 
           
        




        
 
     
 
         
            
       
 
           





      
      
         
        
      
  
 
           
         
         
           




        
            
        
     
 
        
          
        
       
2.46 The government is already undertaking initiatives to keep children and young people safe
online and to build momentum ahead of the implementation of the online harms regime.
2.47 These measures include providing practical guidance for business on how to improve
child safety online, steps companies can take to tackle cyberbullying, collaboration between
government and industry to better understand the impacts of online harms on users, and
cross-government research on child safety.
Box 11: Interim measures ahead of the online harms regulatory framework
‘One Stop Shop for Companies on Protecting Children Online’
● The government will publish a ‘One Stop Shop’ with practical guidance for
companies on how to protect children online. It will be designed as an interim tool to
support businesses ahead of the regulatory framework.
● The One Stop Shop will support smaller companies in particular, providing practical
advice to help them better understand child online harms and their existing legal
requirements.
Cyberbullying
● The consultation highlighted that vulnerable young people are in particular need of
support to stay safe online to tackle harms such as cyberbullying. We expect the
regulator to set out steps companies need to take to tackle cyberbullying in its codes
of practice. The Social Media Code of Practice, published alongside the White Paper,
sets out the principles that companies should adhere to in the interim before the
regulator is operational.
● In the longer term, the government will align its work on cyberbullying with the cross-
government plan on tackling loneliness, recognising that loneliness, particularly
amongst young people, can be exacerbated or directly caused by cyberbullying. The 
government will conduct further research and develop further guidance on tackling
cyberbullying as part of this.
Screen time
● Being online can be a hugely positive experience for children and young people.
However, the impact of harmful content and activity can be particularly damaging for
children and there is also growing concern about the relationship between social
media and the mental health of children and young people. 
● In 2019, the UK Chief Medical Officers conducted a systematic evidence review on
children and young people’s screen and social media use. Whilst the research did
not present evidence of a causal relationship between screen-based activities and







activities and negative effects, such as increased risk of anxiety or depression. The 
Chief Medical Officers therefore advised a precautionary approach to screen time, 
including agreeing boundaries with children and young people around their screen 
usage and considering the impact that screen use has on health promoting activities 
such as sleep.   
● Since the Chief Medical Officers’ review, the Department for Health and Social Care 
has commissioned research to explore the views of children and young people to 
help prioritise research questions on social media and mental health. It will also be 
developing robust methodologies to better examine the relationship between the 
two.  
Box 12: Collaboration with industry  
 
Harmful content including suicide, self-harm, and eating disorder content:  
 
● The online harms framework will place regulatory responsibilities on in-scope 
companies likely to be accessed by children to protect their child users from harmful 
content and activity, including suicide, self-harm and eating disorder content. 
However there are wider government-led initiatives to develop voluntary cooperation 
in this area ahead of legislation.  
 
● The Department for Health and Social Care has coordinated a strategic partnership 
with social media companies and the Samaritans to set guidance on moderating 
suicide and self-harm content, and educating users to stay safe online. 
 
Box 13: Cross-government research 
 
Verification of Children Online 
 
● Companies will need to know which of their users are children and this is likely to be 
achieved through the use of age assurance technologies.  
 
● Age assurance is the broad term given to the spectrum of measures that can be used 
to assure a user’s age online. Age assurance allows companies and users to jointly 
choose from a range of measures that are appropriate to the specific risks posed and 
their service needs. The selected methods may rely on different sources of data, 
which may have different privacy implications and cost models. 
   
● The Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, the Home Office and 
Government Communications Headquarters have collaborated on a recent child 
safety research project - the Verification of Children Online - that responds to the 






        
        
 
     
         
     
 
             
        
    
            
       
 
             
        
              
            
            
    
 
          
      
 
         
           
     
 
          
         




with parents and children, industry, regulators and online safety professionals to 
consider the technical, commercial, legal and behavioural factors that would enable 
companies to recognise and better protect their child users. A key success of the 
project was a technical trial run during phase two. The trial successfully demonstrated 
that age assurance solutions could be run at scale in a way that was simple for users 
and protects the privacy of their personal data.  
 
● The Verification of Children Online (VoCO) Phase 2 Report was published in 
November 2020.35  
Codes of practice
White Paper: The White Paper stated that the independent regulator would set out how
companies could fulfil the duty of care in codes of practice.
Consultation responses and stakeholder engagement: Some respondents argued that
too many codes of practice would cause confusion, duplication, and potentially, an over
reliance on removal of content by risk averse companies.
Final policy position: There will not be a code of practice for each category of harmful
content. The codes of practice will focus on systems, processes and governance that in-
scope companies need to put in place to uphold their regulatory responsibilities. The 
regulator will decide which codes to produce, with the exception of the codes on child sexual
exploitation and abuse and preventing terrorist use of the internet.
The government will set out high level objectives for the codes of practice with the regulator
ensuring that its codes of practice meet these objectives during drafting. Ofcom will consult
with relevant parties during the drafting of the codes before sending the final draft to the
Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and the Home Secretary. Ministers
will have the power to reject a draft code and require the regulator to make modifications for
reasons relating to government policy.
Parliament will also have the opportunity to debate and vote on the objectives and the
completed codes will be laid in Parliament.
Due to the seriousness of the harms, and to bridge the gap until the regulator is operational,
the government has published interim codes of practice on how to tackle online terrorist and
child sexual exploitation and abuse content and activity.
2.48 Ofcom will have a duty to issue statutory codes of practice that set out the steps
companies can take to fulfil the duty of care. The codes of practice will focus on systems,
processes and governance that in-scope companies need to put in place to uphold their
35 ‘VoCO (Verification of Children Online) Phase 2 report’ GCHQ, DCMS, Home Office and ACE,




        
             
       
 
               
         
              
          
      
   
 
        
              
           
 
   
             
             
         
        
        
             
         
         
 
        
      
        
         
           
        
          
      
 
            
      
        
     
 
    
   
 
regulatory responsibilities. Companies may take alternative steps to those set out in the codes
of practice, provided they can demonstrate to Ofcom that those steps are as effective as or
exceed the standards set out in the codes.
2.49 Given the range of services in scope of the regulatory framework, some of the steps may
not be applicable to every company; conversely the codes will not cover every conceivable 
risk or emerging technology. If there is no code of practice which covers a particular emerging
technology, companies will still need to be compliant with the overarching duty of care. This
can be achieved by in-scope companies assessing and responding to the risk associated with
those emerging technologies. 
2.50 Ofcom will be required to consult with a range of stakeholders when developing codes of
practice. This will be critical to ensure that codes take into account existing expertise and best
practice regarding how to effectively tackle the range of harmful content and activity in scope
of regulation. 
Interim codes of practice
2.51 The White Paper committed the government to work with law enforcement agencies and
other relevant bodies to produce interim codes of practice on terrorism and child sexual
exploitation and abuse due to the serious nature of these harms. The interim codes are
voluntary and are intended to bridge the gap until the regulator is operational and ready to
produce its own statutory codes on terrorism and child sexual exploitation and abuse, building
on the work of the interim codes. The government will work with industry stakeholders to
review the implementation of the interim codes so that lessons can be learned and shared
with Ofcom, to inform the development of their substantive codes.
2.52 The interim codes are published alongside this response. The government has
undertaken an extensive period of engagement across wider government, industry,
international partners and civil society, to ensure the measures set out are proportionate but
robust enough to tackle these most serious and illegal online harms. As the government is
proposing that the interim codes of practice are adopted by all companies in scope, this will
include small and medium-sized enterprises. To reduce the burden on businesses and ensure
consistency across the industry, the interim codes set out detailed aims and examples of best
practice on how to implement each principle.
2.53 The child sexual exploitation and abuse interim code of practice builds on the Voluntary
Principles to Counter Online Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, that were developed by the
UK, US, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand governments, following consultation with tech
companies and Non Governmental Organisations.36 
36 ‘Voluntary Principles to Counter Online Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse’ Five Country




        
  
          
               
        
 
      
      
              
     
          
    
 
      
         
          
            
        
      
     
            
    
          
         
       
           
 
   
 
      
      
       
          
    
 
          
       
          
         
         
             
           
 
 
   
  
Using technology to identify illegal child sexual exploitation and abuse content and
activity
White Paper: The White Paper set out that some private channels would be in scope of the
online harms regime, however companies would not be required to scan or monitor for illegal
content on these services, reflecting the importance of privacy.
Consultation responses and stakeholder engagement: Some consultation respondents 
including industry and civil liberty groups argued that private communications should either
fall out of scope or be subject to very limited requirements, to protect user privacy. By
contrast, some online safety organisations and children’s charities argued private
communications should be in scope because there is a high risk of harmful activity - such
as child grooming - on private channels.
Final policy position: The regulatory framework will apply to both public communication
channels and services where users expect a greater degree of privacy. The regulator will
set out how companies can fulfil their duty of care in codes of practice, including what
measures are likely to be appropriate in the context of private communications. Companies
in scope will need to consider the impact on users' privacy and ensure users understand
how company systems and processes affect user privacy. The scale, severity and
complexity of child sexual exploitation and abuse is particularly concerning, with private
channels being exploited by offenders. In light of this, the regulator will have the power to
require companies to use automated technology that is highly accurate to identify illegal
child sexual exploitation and abuse activity or content on their services. Recognising the
importance of protecting users’ privacy, the government will ensure this will be used only
where there are no alternative measures that are capable of achieving the same aim of
reducing harm and subject to stringent legal safeguards to protect users’ rights.
Child sexual exploitation and abuse on private channels
2.54 The government and many stakeholders are particularly concerned about the extent of
child sexual exploitation and abuse occurring on some private channels, where offenders
believe their illegal activity is less likely to be detected. This could include sharing child sexual
abuse material with other offenders, grooming children for sexual purposes, or the
livestreaming of abuse.
2.55 These actions cause severe harm and there is clear evidence they are occurring. For
example, 12 million of the 18.4 million worldwide child sexual exploitation and abuse reports
made by Facebook in 2019 were for content shared on private channels.37 The identification
of this material has real world impact, allowing law enforcement to arrest offenders and 
safeguard children who would otherwise have been at risk of, or subject to, ongoing abuse. It
also protects victims, who can continue to be traumatised long after their abuse by the
knowledge that offenders continue to trade in and enjoy the images of their abuse.
37 ‘Tech Companies Detect a Surge in Online Videos of Child Sexual Abuse’ The New York Times, 




            
          
       
         
         
       
          
       
          
         
 
 
         
     
      
          
             
          
       
 
            
           
        
    
  
         
       
     
            
        
       
      
             
          
             
         
            
             
          
         
     
          
              
 
       
 
2.56 Technology that can identify known illegal content accurately and at scale has been in
use for many years, supplied by a number of non governmental organisations and web hosting
services, and new technology continues to evolve. Some companies already take action
against child sexual exploitation and abuse on private channels, but others do not. For
example, some companies use PhotoDNA (see Box 14) to identify child sexual abuse material
and the gaming sector commonly uses technology to identify harmful activity in communication
between users, particularly where a game is aimed at younger children. According to
Facebook’s community standards enforcement report, in 2019, they actioned 37.4 million
pieces of content that violated their child nudity or child sexual exploitation policy. More than
99% of this came to light as a result of the company’s proactive efforts (such as use of
technology).38 
2.57 The government has set out in the interim code of practice for online child sexual
exploitation and abuse that companies should consider voluntarily using automated
technology to identify child sexual exploitation and abuse. The government will continue to
support companies using technology to identify online child sexual exploitation and abuse on
a voluntary basis once online harms legislation is in force. The government does not intend
that restrictions placed on the regulator’s power to require a company to use technology
should limit companies that choose to go further in taking action.
2.58 Given the serious risk of harm to children, the regulator must have appropriate powers to
compel companies to take the most effective action to tackle illegal child sexual exploitation
and abuse content and activity on their services, including private communications, subject to
stringent legal safeguards.
2.59 Therefore, the regulator will have the express power, where alternative measures cannot
effectively address child sexual exploitation and abuse (see 2.58), to require a company to
use automated technology that is highly accurate to identify only illegal child sexual
exploitation and abuse content or activity on their service. The power is more likely to be
considered proportionate on public platforms than on private services. The regulator can take
enforcement action if this requirement is not met.
2.60 Robust safeguards will be included in the online harms legislation to govern when the
regulator can require the use of automated technology. The regulator will only be able to
require the use of tools that are highly accurate in identifying only illegal content, minimising
the inadvertent flagging of legal content (‘false positives’) for human review. The regulator will
advise the government on the accuracy of tools and make operational decisions regarding
whether or not a specific company should be required to use them. However, before the
regulator can use the power it will need to seek approval from Ministers on the basis that
sufficiently accurate tools exist. The government assesses that currently, sufficiently accurate
tools exist for identifying illegal child sexual exploitation and abuse material that has previously
been assessed as being illegal.
2.61 In addition, in order to inform debate around the use of automated technology, the
regulator will have to report annually to the Home Secretary and lay a report before Parliament





              
            
  
 
          
      
 
        
          
  
            
      
      
         
 
 
       
          
 
       
 
        
         
          
  
 
          
        
         
   
 
             
           
    
 
          
       
   
 
    
          
         




on the use of the power, including the effectiveness and accuracy of the available tools, and
any other factors relevant to their suitability for use (for example affordability, availability, and
effectiveness).
2.62 In addition to ensuring the accuracy of tools, before requiring a company to use
technology to identify child sexual exploitation and abuse, the regulator would need to:
● have gathered evidence which it assesses as demonstrating persistent and prevalent
child sexual exploitation and abuse on the service, which the company has failed to
address.
● be satisfied that no alternative, less intrusive approaches are available to address the
problem and the requirement is proportionate.
● issue a public notice of the regulator’s intention to require a company to use automated
technology to identify child sexual activity and exploitation, to ensure that users are
fully informed.
2.63 In exercising this power, the regulator will balance users’ rights to privacy and freedom
of expression with the rights of children to be protected from sexual exploitation and abuse.
Box 14: Example of automated technology: PhotoDNA
● One of the technologies commonly used today to identify child sexual abuse material
is PhotoDNA, or ‘hash matching’. This converts images into a numerical code (or
hash) that can be compared against the codes for known images of child sexual
abuse.
● This technology is only capable of assessing whether an image is child sexual abuse,
and makes no other inferences about the image or user’s communication. When a
match is detected, the image can be reviewed, blocked, taken down or reported by
the company.
● The false positive rate is estimated to be between one in two billion and one in ten
billion, protecting the privacy of legitimate users whilst ensuring no safe space for
child sexual abuse offenders to operate.39 
● A range of non governmental organisations and web hosting providers make this
technology and the hash data sets available to companies looking to protect their
service from abuse.
Using technology to identify terrorist content and activity on public services 
White Paper: The White Paper set out that the regulator would not compel companies to
undertake general monitoring on their online services, as this would place a disproportionate







       
      
              
             
      
      
 
        
     
         
 
    
          
           
            
         
        
            
 
          
           
         
          
       
      
       
     
 
          
       
            
    
 
              
     
         
        
     
 
        
            
        
         
 
        
          
      
Instead, the new regulatory framework would increase the responsibility of online services
in a way that is compatible with the European Union’s e-Commerce Directive, which limits
their liability for illegal content until they have knowledge of its existence, and have failed to
remove it from their services in good time. However, it noted the strong case for mandating
specific monitoring for tightly defined categories of illegal content where there is a threat to 
national security or the physical safety of children.
Consultation responses and stakeholder engagement: Industry welcomed the
commitment to maintaining existing intermediary liability provisions set out in the e-
Commerce Directive, including the prohibition on general monitoring.
Final policy position:
Many companies already use technology to identify and remove illegal terrorist content from
their services. The regulator will also be given an additional express power in legislation, to
require a company to use that technology to identify and remove illegal terrorist content from
their public services where this is the only effective, proportionate and necessary action
available, and the regulator is confident that the tools available are highly accurate at
identifying only illegal content to minimise the need for human review of legal content.
Companies’ liability for specific pieces of content will remain unchanged. Once a company
is aware of illegal content on their service, it will still be required to take this down quickly
otherwise it could become liable for that content. Where technology is used to identify the
tightly defined categories of illegal content set out above, companies’ will therefore need to
remove it to avoid incurring liability. The technology used will be highly accurate and
therefore unlikely to identify illegal content that does not constitute an offence relating to
terrorism. This applies equally to the requirements relating to child sexual exploitation and
abuse, set out above.
2.64 The White Paper set out the reasonable steps that companies should take in advance of
legislation to prevent new and known terrorist content and activity on their services. This
included the proactive use of automated technology, where appropriate, to identify, flag, block
or remove illegal content and activity.
2.65 The government has set out in the interim code of practice for online terrorist content and
activity that companies should consider voluntarily using automated technology to identify and
remove terrorist content and activity from their public services. The government will continue
to support companies using technology to identify online terrorist content and activity on a
voluntary basis once online harms legislation is in force.
2.66 The regulator will also be given an additional express power in legislation to require a
company to use such automated technology to identify and remove illegal terrorist content
from their public channels, where this is the only effective, proportionate and necessary action
available. The regulator can take enforcement action if this requirement is not met.
2.67 This power will be used only if (i) the technology is highly accurate in identifying illegal
terrorist content (ii) there is evidence of persistent and prevalent illegal terrorist activity on




              
 
 
        
             
     
 
          
             
          
         
       
        
          
                
          
         
    
 
         
            
       
   
       
            
         
           
      
  
 
     
         
          
         
             
     
 
         
       




     
 
the rest of the online harms framework, any requirements resulting from this power must be
proportionate.
2.68 Automated technologies are already employed by some companies on a voluntary basis,
as part of their own efforts to tackle terrorist content and activity on their services. However,
this is not done widely or consistently.
2.69 Companies also rely on user reports or referrals from law enforcement to alert them to
content already on their services, so that they can remove it (if illegal or breaching their terms
and conditions). These reports also help fine-tune their automated tools. However, reactive
measures such as those set out above cannot by themselves adequately tackle the speed
and scale with which terrorist content online is often disseminated. Referrals from the Counter
Terrorism Internet Referral Unit successfully led to over 310,000 individual pieces of terrorist
content being removed by companies between 2010 and the end of 2018,40 but transparency
reports indicate that this is just a fraction of what companies can action proactively on their
own services. For example, Facebook reported that between April and June 2020, 8.7 million
pieces of terrorist content were actioned, 99.6% of which were found and flagged by Facebook
before users reported it.41 
2.70 The safeguards built into the regulation, detailed in paragraph 2.62, will ensure the
approach to terrorist content and activity on public services is proportionate – balancing taking
action against illegal terrorist content and activity in the interests of protecting national security
and upholding users’ rights online.
Data retention and reporting to law enforcement
White Paper: The White Paper stated that the regulator would provide specific guidance in
its code of practice on the content companies should preserve following removal and for 
how long. It also set out that the regulator would provide guidance on when companies
should proactively alert law enforcement and other relevant government agencies about
specific illegal content.
Consultation responses and stakeholder engagement: Stakeholders, including the
National Crime Agency and National Centre for Missing and Exploited Children, argued that
there should be new, mandatory reporting requirements for child exploitation and sexual
abuse content to increase reporting and standardise the approach. In their view, this will
improve the ability of law enforcement to tackle child sexual exploitation and abuse offenders
and safeguard victims in the UK and elsewhere.
Final policy position: The government is minded to introduce a requirement for companies
to report child sexual exploitation and abuse identified on their services, with these reports
being made to a designated body. A requirement to retain child sexual exploitation and
40 ‘Together, We’re Tackling Online Terrorism’ Counter Terrorism Policing, December 2018 (last 
viewed in November 2020)
41 ‘Dangerous Organizations: Terrorism and Organized Hate - transparency’ Facebook, 2020 (last 




           
     
 
       
          
         
 
            
         
            
      
          
 
          
       
         
           
          
            
        
         
 
         
          
           
 
 
          
        
              
           
         
    
   
            
        
       
      
 
      
       
            
     
abuse data will not be introduced through this legislation. However the government is
considering introducing this through alternative legislation.
With regards to terrorist content and activity, the government expects companies to report
to law enforcement where they consider there is a threat to life or risk of imminent attack.
The legislation will not introduce a requirement for companies to retain this data.
2.71 The White Paper indicated that the regulator would be expected to set out in the terrorist
and child sexual exploitation and abuse codes of practice the reasonable steps that companies
could take in relation to retaining data and reporting these types of content. The regulator
would include guidance on how long companies should retain data for and the circumstances
in which content should be reported to law enforcement and other agencies.
2.72 Following the White Paper consultation and further engagement with law enforcement
and other agencies, the government is minded to introduce a mandatory requirement on
companies to report child sexual exploitation and abuse identified on their services. Further
work is being undertaken to explore a suitable body to receive these reports and to ensure
this system does not duplicate companies’ existing reporting obligations. This would be a
standalone legislative requirement, rather than part of the duty of care. This approach reflects
the seriousness of this crime and seeks to ensure that companies provide high quality reports
with the information law enforcement need to identify offenders and safeguard victims.
2.73 Companies will be encouraged to retain child sexual exploitation and abuse data for law
enforcement purposes. The online harms legislation will not introduce a requirement to retain 
this data but the government is considering introducing this requirement within alternative
legislation.
2.74 The government expects companies to report terrorist content and activity on their
services to law enforcement where they consider there is a threat to life or risk of imminent
attack. The government will work with the regulator to ensure that it encourages this and
provides companies with clear guidance on how this could best be done and information on
where to report to. The online harms legislation will not introduce a legal requirement for
companies to report and retain this data.
Disinformation and misinformation
White Paper: The White Paper did not set out a definitive position on how disinformation
and misinformation would be addressed under the regulatory framework. Disinformation
was included in an indicative list of harmful content or activity that would be within scope of
the legislation, because it can be harmful to both individuals and to society.
Consultation responses and stakeholder engagement: A range of stakeholders,
including civil society organisations, raised concerns about including disinformation and
misinformation in scope of the regulation because of the impact this might have on freedom




        
     
 
      
      
  
 
       
          
          
          
    
 
    
           
 
 
         
      
        
              
   
 
       
           
            
     
         
           
 
      
         
          
       
           
          
   
          
        
 
      




                  
                  
        
misinformation poses to individual users, as well as its potential broader impact on public 
safety, national security and community cohesion.
Final policy position: Companies will need to address disinformation and misinformation
that poses a reasonably foreseeable risk of significant harm to individuals (e.g. relating to
public health).
The legislation will also introduce additional provisions targeted at building understanding
and driving action to tackle disinformation and misinformation. For example, establishing an
expert working group on disinformation and misinformation, measures to improve
transparency about how companies deal with disinformation and building on Ofcom’s
existing duties to promote media literacy.
Where disinformation and misinformation presents a significant threat to public safety, public 
health or national security, the regulator will have the power to act.
2.75 The White Paper set out the dangers of online disinformation and misinformation to both
individuals and society. Disinformation is the deliberate creation and dissemination of false
and/or manipulated information that is intended to deceive and mislead audiences, either for
the purposes of causing harm, or for political, personal or financial gain. Misinformation refers
to inadvertently spreading false information.
2.76 COVID-19 has brought these dangers into sharp focus. Ofcom data suggests that in
week one of the UK lockdown, nearly 50% of respondents reported seeing information they
thought to be false or misleading about the pandemic, with this figure at almost 60% for 18-34
year old respondents.42 While Ofcom has recorded a gradual decrease in self-reported
exposure to narratives considered false or misleading, navigating a COVID-19 online
environment can be challenging and at times, confusing for many people in the UK.43 
2.77 The government is taking a range of steps to tackle disinformation and misinformation
online. In response to the pandemic, the government stood up the Department for Digital,
Culture, Media and Sport-led cross-Whitehall Counter Disinformation Unit, to provide a
comprehensive picture of the extent, scope and the reach of disinformation and 
misinformation, and to work with partners to ensure appropriate action is taken. Since standing
up, the Unit has observed a range of false narratives, some of which have caused significant
harm to individuals and society. Examples include conspiracy theories inaccurately linking
COVID-19 with 5G technologies, health misinformation promoting a range of junk cures, and
stories using outdated footage to suggest certain groups were breaking social distancing.
2.78 As the pandemic has progressed, the Unit has also seen other narratives gain traction,
particularly those which seek to undermine efforts to produce a COVID-19 vaccine. Anti-
42 ‘Covid-19 new and information: summary of views about misinformation’ Ofcom, June 2020 (last 
viewed in November 2020)
43 
Concepts and definitions of misinformation can be partial and subjective, and often depend upon the respondent’s own sets
of beliefs and affiliations.The survey data relies on self-reported exposure and is, therefore, unlikely to represent the true




       
          
       
           
          
     
 
           
        
           
        
       
               
     
          
      
      
       
 
      
 
       
        
       
 
             
          
          
     
     
 
       
          
        
        
    
          
        
        
          
         
           
         
      
      
     
 
vaccination disinformation and misinformation has the potential to cause significant harm to
individuals. Given the pace at which such narratives can develop on social media, combined 
with established movements against inoculation, reducing the risk of such harm remains a key
priority. The Department for Digital Culture, Media and Sport is working with cross-Whitehall
partners, particularly the Department for Health and Social Care, and social media services,
to mitigate and tackle the risk of anti-vaccination false information.
2.79 Coupled with these efforts, the government has continued to build audience resilience to
disinformation and misinformation, enabling people to critically assess, appraise and
challenge information online. Through the ‘Don’t Feed the Beast’ campaign and SHARE
checklist, UK users have been given five easy steps to identify false content, encouraging
them to consider information they share online. The forthcoming online media literacy strategy 
(see below and Part 5 for more information on Media Literacy) will set out more action to
improve and strengthen audience resilience. Under the Cabinet Office led Defending
Democracy programme, the government is also taking further steps to strengthen the integrity
of UK elections and promote fact-based and open discourse. This includes responding to
recommendations on press sustainability made in the Cairncross review (see Box 22), and
the introduction of a digital imprints regime.
Disinformation and misinformation under the new regulatory framework
2.80 Legislation has an important part to play in tackling this harm. The White Paper included
disinformation in the indicative list of harmful content or activity that would be within scope of
the legislation, because it can be harmful to both individuals and to society.
2.81 As set out in paragraph 2.2, the duty of care will apply to content or activity which could
cause significant physical or psychological harm to an individual, including disinformation and
misinformation. Where disinformation is unlikely to cause this type of harm it will not fall in 
scope of regulation. Ofcom should not be involved in decisions relating to political opinions or 
campaigning, shared by domestic actors within the law.
2.82 Under our proposals, disinformation and misinformation that could cause significant harm
to an individual will be within scope of the duty of care. The vast majority of disinformation and
misinformation is legal, while potentially harmful. As an example, this would include content
which suggests that users should go against established medical advice, such as avoiding
vaccinations. There may also be some cases where disinformation is illegal and could cause
significant harm to individuals - for example, disinformation which directly incited harm against
individuals. In these cases, companies would be expected to remove such content.
2.83 Some types of legal but harmful disinformation and misinformation are likely to be
proposed in secondary legislation as categories of priority harm that companies must address
in their terms and conditions. Companies must also risk assess for categories of emerging
harm. As with other legal but harmful content, companies providing Category 1 services will
need to make clear what is acceptable on their services for such content in their terms and
conditions and will be required to enforce this. Companies whose services are likely to be
accessed by children will also need to take steps to protect children from disinformation and




       
     
           
              
       
     
  
 
      
           
       
         
     
  
 
      
         
             
           
             
         
 
    
      
        
 
            
           
         
       
     
 
2.84 As the pandemic has demonstrated, there may be instances when urgent action is
required to address disinformation and misinformation during emergency situations. Where
disinformation and misinformation presents a significant threat to public safety, public health
or national security, the regulator will have the power to act. In such situations, Ofcom will be
able to take steps to build users’ awareness and resilience to disinformation and
misinformation, or require companies to report on steps they are taking in light of such a
situation.
2.85 To ensure the future regulatory framework is well equipped to deal with the longer-term
challenges presented by disinformation and misinformation, the regulator will be required to
establish an expert working group on disinformation and misinformation. The working group
will aim to build consensus and technical knowledge on how to tackle disinformation and
misinformation. This working group will include a range of stakeholders such as rights groups,
academics and companies.
2.86 The regulatory framework will also help build an understanding of what companies are
doing in relation to disinformation and misinformation through transparency reporting
requirements. As set out in the transparency section, the regulator will have the power to
require certain companies to publish annual transparency reports, setting out the extent and
response to this harm. As part of this, companies could be required, where relevant, to report
on processes and systems in place to respond to disinformation and misinformation.
2.87 The regulatory framework will build on Ofcom’s existing duties to promote media literacy.
This will help increase user awareness of, and resilience to, disinformation and misinformation
online (for more information on Media Literacy, see Part 5).
2.88 The government has also committed to publishing a safety by design framework (see
Part 5). This will set out best practice and specific measures that companies can take to
address the risk of harm on their services. This will include design measures to address the
risk of misinformation and disinformation spreading on services, and empower users to








   
 
 
    
         
     
           
           
           
       
 
             
        
    
        
          
 
               
 
            
       
          
  
 
      
 
            
        
           
    
 
        
    
          
           
 
           
             
            
             
       
 
Part 3: The regulator
Summary
Consultation questions covered in Part 3:
❖ What role should Parliament play in scrutinising the work of the regulator, including
the development of codes of practice?
❖ Should an online harms regulator be: (i) a new public body, or (ii) an existing public
body? If your answer to question 10 is (ii), which body or bodies should it be? 
❖ A new or existing regulator is intended to be cost neutral: on what basis should any 
funding contributions from industry be determined?
● The government can now confirm that Ofcom will be named as the online harms
regulator in legislation. Ofcom has a strong strategic fit for this role, and relevant 
organisational experience as a robust independent regulator. Empowering an
existing regulatory body will help the timely introduction of the online harms regime 
by allowing Ofcom to begin preparations now to take on the role.
● Ofcom will raise the required income to cover the costs of the regime from industry.
● The regulator will be accountable to Parliament. Ofcom as the regulator will lay its
annual report and accounts before Parliament and be subject to Select Committee
scrutiny. The annual report will give details about how it has discharged its functions
in relation to online harms.
Body (new vs. existing) and identity of regulator
White Paper: The White Paper stated that the online harms regime will be overseen and
regulated by an independent regulator. It also explained that the government would consider
whether a broader restructuring of the regulatory landscape would reduce the risk of
duplication and minimise burdens on business.
Consultation responses and stakeholder engagement: The responses emphasised the
need for there to be consistency between existing and new regulatory regimes, and for the
regulator to be equipped to function effectively. Views on the identity of the regulator were
balanced, highlighting the benefits and risks of a new body versus an existing one.
Final policy position: In February 2020, the government announced that it was minded to
give Ofcom the role of the independent online harms regulator. The government can now
confirm that Ofcom will be named as the regulator in legislation. Empowering an existing
regulatory body will help the timely introduction of the online harms regime, by allowing




              
         
         
       
        
 
 
         
     
      
           
        
           
        
 
          
    
          
             
     
            
    
 
                 
        
          
      
         
 
       
      
            
             
            
            
            
       




    
 
     
          
 
3.1 To inform the set up of the independent online harms regulator, the consultation asked
questions about its identity, funding model and accountability to Parliament. The government
has examined a range of options including creating a new body or appointing an existing
regulator. These options were assessed against a number of key criteria, including
effectiveness, efficiency and strategic coherence, and were informed by feedback from the
consultation response.
3.2 In February 2020, the government announced that it was minded to give Ofcom the role
of the independent online harms regulator. Ministers have now decided to confirm the
appointment of Ofcom to this role, subject to the passage of legislation. This preference was
based on its organisational experience, robustness, and experience of delivering whilst
holding challenging, high-profile remits across a range of sectors. Ofcom also offered a strong
strategic fit given its role regulating activities increasingly related to online harms, and their
new responsibilities in relation to regulating UK-established video sharing platforms.
3.3 Ofcom was established by the Office of Communications Act 2002 from the convergence
of five existing communications regulators covering broadcasting and telecommunications,
and received its full authority from the Communications Act 2003. Since then, it has had other
duties added to its remit, including postal services in 2011 and the BBC in 2017. The
technological revolution of traditional communication industries has meant that digital and 
online services have increasingly become part of Ofcom’s existing remit. It is therefore well
placed to play a similar role for online harms.
3.4 Whilst meeting the challenge of online harms requires new ideas, it is also vital that the
government utilises the experience, expertise and infrastructure of the UK’s existing world 
class regulators. Ofcom has an existing network of relationships in the tech sector, experience
of dealing with a high volume of small businesses, and a research-led, risk-based approach
to regulation. This provides a strong foundation for taking on the online harms regime.
3.5 Earlier this year, the government announced Ofcom as the national regulator for UK-
established video sharing platforms under the Audiovisual Media Services Regulations. These
came into force on 1 November 2020. The regulations introduce new requirements for UK-
established video sharing platforms to protect users from harmful content. In the longer term,
the government intends for the regulation of UK-established video sharing platforms to be part
of the online harms regime. This alignment between the two regimes offers the opportunity for
early engagement with stakeholders and for testing regulatory processes ahead of the online
harms legislation coming into force. Ofcom’s increasing role in regulating activities relating to
online harms further emphasises its strong strategic fit to be the independent online harms
regulator.
Box 15: Audiovisual Media Services Regulations 2020
● The UK’s Audiovisual Media Services Regulations 2020 place requirements on UK-




        
        
           
    
       
           
        
      
 
     
      
            
          
     
    
 
     
       
          
        
    
       
          
       
       
 
           
     
          
       
     
 
 
               
          
            
   
          
         
       
             
        
          
              
       
 
● The regulations include a requirement for UK-established video sharing platforms to
take appropriate measures to protect children from harmful content, and to protect
the general public from incitement to hatred and violence and from criminal content.
They also include requirements relating to standards around advertising. The
statutory framework was introduced into legislation in Autumn 2020 and came into
force from 1 November 2020. Ofcom is actively engaging with providers of video 
sharing platforms, and will be developing and publicly consulting on regulatory
guidance for platforms in the coming months.
● The regulations share broadly similar objectives to the online harms regime. The
government’s preference is for the requirements on UK-established video sharing
platforms to transition to, and be superseded by, the online harms regulatory
framework, once the latter comes into force. Under the online harms regulatory
framework, UK-established video sharing platforms will continue to have systems
and processes in place to protect users.
● The requirements on UK-established video sharing platforms in relation to
audiovisual commercial communications under the Audiovisual Media Services
Regulations 2020, will also be repealed and will not be encompassed in the online
harms regime. This is because the Advertising Standards Authority’s self-regulatory
rules already apply equivalent standards for advertising as those in the regulations. 
The Advertising Standards Authority’s rules require all online advertisers to adhere
to specific advertising standards. Even after the requirements of the revised
regulations have been subsumed by the online harms regime, the Advertising
Standards Authority’s rules will continue to apply to all online advertisers.
● In tandem with the online harms work, the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and
Sport is currently engaged in a programme of work related to online advertising
which, amongst other areas of focus, is looking at ensuring that advertising
regulation answers the needs of the changing advertising marketplace. Further
details on this are set out in Box 3.
3.6 Ofcom has a strong track record of engagement. Its annual report details how it seeks to
understand consumers’ and citizens’ interests and behaviours, and how it engages with 
industry and government. Successful delivery of the online harms regime will require being
able to clearly communicate the purpose and reach of the regulatory framework and the
regulator's role, as well as listening to others. The regulator will be required to take a
consultative approach, including on the production of codes of practice. The legislation will
introduce a super-complaints function and user advocacy mechanisms (see Part 4). Users will
also be able to report their concerns to the regulator, however, the regulator will not investigate
or arbitrate on individual cases. This would conflict with the principle of a systems and
processes approach, and could overwhelm Ofcom, given the likely volume of complaints.
Instead, receiving user complaints will be an essential part of Ofcom’s activity to ensure the




              
          
          
        
         
         
           
         
     
 
     
              
        
          
         
 
         
            
             
         
    
 
          
       
      
         
          
        
   
 
              
          
    
 
         
     
        
 
     
           
    
 
          
          
3.7 The government is confident that Ofcom is the right organisation to deliver the online harms
regulatory regime, subject to final parliamentary approvals. It is a well-established regulator
with a strong reputation internationally and a proven track record of taking evidence-based
decisions which balance robust consumer protection with the need to ensure the regulatory
environment is conducive to economic growth and innovation. It is sensitive to the need not to
impose unnecessary burdens on businesses, and is well versed in best regulatory practice of
being transparent, accountable, proportionate and consistent, taking action only when it is
needed. Ofcom also has extensive experience of acting in the interests of all UK citizens and 
consumers, with offices in each of the nations.
3.8 Ofcom’s extensive experience of regulating the communications sector in the UK means
that this new role is a logical extension of its existing remit. Crucially, Ofcom’s experience in
broadcasting regulation in particular means that it is well practised in understanding and
making judgements about the balance between protection from harm and upholding freedom
of expression. Overall, Ofcom is a strong strategic fit for the role.
3.9 There are advantages of working with an existing regulatory body, when compared to
creating a new body. Whilst the government remains responsible for the overall policy and for
creating the legislation, it is actively engaging with Ofcom to seek the benefit of its regulatory
expertise and experience in understanding how the regulatory framework will work in practice.
The government expects this process to continue as the legislation is prepared for introduction
in Parliament.
3.10 Ahead of its role being confirmed in legislation, Ofcom must seize the opportunity to
prepare organisationally and to build on the opportunities provided by its current
responsibilities as the national regulator for UK-established video sharing platforms. Ofcom
will be able to further its engagement with companies whose services will be in scope of the
online harms regime. It will be able to set out the expectations on companies and ensure a
fuller understanding of what compliance will entail ahead of the duty of care coming into force.
Governance, capabilities and infrastructure
White Paper: The White Paper stated that the regulator will be an independent body and
that the government will take steps to ensure that the regulator can command public 
confidence in its independence, impartiality, capability and effectiveness.
Consultation responses and stakeholder engagement: Most respondents to the
consultation viewed an independent and empowered regulator as critical to delivering the
regime. There were no particular views on the regulator’s governance arrangements.
Final policy position: The online harms legislation will maintain Ofcom’s organisational
independence and governance arrangements, and clearly define the respective roles of
government and the regulator.
3.11 The importance of regulators being independent from undue influence - from government,




          
            
        
           
      
     
           
          
            
      
         
            
          
           
      
            
              
    
            
            
        
         
              
             
        
            
      
         
             
        
        
          
         
           
            
           
       
        
       
       
area - is an important element of effective regulation. The White Paper stated that the regulator
will be an independent body and that the government will take steps to ensure that the
regulator can command public confidence in its independence, impartiality, capability and
effectiveness. This will be important for online harms regulation, particularly to manage
concerns about protecting freedom of expression.
3.12 Ofcom’s founding legislation already provides it with a high degree of independence as
it is operationally independent from government, giving it the statutory provisions to manage
its own affairs. The government will set a clear scope for the regime and remit of the regulator
in legislation. It will give the regulator a high level of independence over fulfilling its duties, and
delivering the functions set out in Box 16.
3.13 In some areas, such as the production of codes of practice and the threshold for
companies in scope to pay the annual fee, the government will maintain levers to ensure the
policy intent of the regulatory framework is maintained. The government will introduce a power
to allow the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport to issue guidance to the
regulator, with clearly defined scope and use. This will enable the government to set out further
detail on regulatory processes, but will not stray into operational matters or seek to fetter
Ofcom’s independence in how it operates the regime. The final version of this guidance will
be subject to parliamentary approval.
3.14 There will also be an option for the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and
Sport to issue a Statement of Strategic Priorities in relation to the regulatory framework. This
power will be similar to the existing powers the Secretary of State has in relation to
telecommunications, the management of the radio spectrum, and postal services. This will
allow the government to be clear on the overall strategic direction for tackling online harms
and to respond at a high level to future changes. The Statement of Strategic Priorities will
require external consultation (including with Ofcom) and approval by Parliament. It is not
intended for this to be in place, or be needed, at the outset of the regime. Its main aim will be
to cater for changes in the digital and regulatory landscape.
3.15 The Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport appoints the non-executive
members of the Ofcom Board including the chair, and will work with Ofcom to ensure that the
Board has the necessary skills and expertise as it takes on these new responsibilities.
3.16 In addition to this, it is vital that Ofcom has the right skills and expertise to discharge the
responsibilities it will have effectively. For example, Ofcom has recognised that it will need
more expertise in technology, especially emerging tech, the use of Artificial Intelligence and
how this is driving commercial and consumer change. This will be increasingly relevant to all
of Ofcom’s sectors. It will be needed regardless of Ofcom’s online harms role, albeit at a
different scale, and ultimately by all regulators overseeing activities and sectors that have an
increasingly digital dimension. Ofcom is in the process of building these capabilities and has
created a new Emerging Technology directorate and data science team as part of its efforts
to do so. Its confirmation as regulator will enable it to drive forward its plans to recruit the





   
 
              
   
 
       
     
      
         
 
         
       
 
        
             
         
           
          
       
         
     
        
           
    
           
       
            
 
       
       
         
     
       
     
            
            
       
   
 
             
Accountability to Parliament
White Paper: The White Paper stated that it will be important to ensure that Parliament is
able to scrutinise the regulator’s work.
Consultation responses and stakeholder engagement: Responses to the consultation
question showed strong support for parliamentary oversight. Most stakeholders agreed that
Parliament should not interfere with the regulator’s independence in drafting codes of 
practice. Several responses suggested establishing a dedicated body for reviewing codes.
Final policy position: The regulator will be accountable to Parliament for its regulatory
activities, including specific aspects of the regime beyond primary legislation.
3.17 The section above sets out ways in which the regulator will be accountable to the
government. In addition it will be accountable to Parliament. Ofcom, as the regulator, will lay
its annual report and accounts before Parliament and be subject to Select Committee scrutiny.
This will include the chair and senior managers appearing before Select Committees as well
as pre-appointment scrutiny for the chair by the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and
Sport Select Committee. This is in line with Ofcom’s current arrangements.
3.18 Parliament will also have a role in approving a number of aspects of the regulatory
framework through its scrutiny of secondary legislation. This will include the statutory
instruments establishing the objectives set by the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media 
and Sport for the codes of practice, the codes of practice themselves and the priority
categories for harms.
3.19 The Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport will undertake a review of the
effectiveness of the regime 2-5 years after entry into force, producing a report which will then
be laid in Parliament. Parliament will have an opportunity to debate the findings of the report.
3.20 To ensure regulatory requirements are proportionate, Ofcom will be required to conduct
and publish impact assessments for proposals which will affect businesses in scope of the
legislation. This will include codes of practice (detailed in Part 4), but may also include other
policy areas such as enforcement, information gathering, transparency, super-complaints,
media literacy or funding. The regulator will have a specific duty to assess the impact of its
proposals on small and micro businesses, to ensure undue regulatory burdens are not placed
on them. It will be required to consult on impact assessments, to ensure it is gathering the
best available evidence and to provide transparency. Ofcom will also be required to report on
the impact assessments it has undertaken in annual reports to Parliament.
Regulator funding model




         
         
 
 
       
     
            
      
     
 
             
       
 
              
            
         
 
     
 
             
                
                
           
            
           
          
 
           
            
            
           
          
       
        
 
 
            
             
     
 
         
         
 
             
             
           
      
regulator will be funded by industry in the medium term. The government indicated it would
consider a range of options to fund regulator activity, including fees, charges and levies on
services in scope.
Consultation responses and stakeholder engagement: There was broad agreement
amongst stakeholders and respondents to the consultation, that funding should primarily be
from industry. However, it was felt that the model should be proportionate and practical for
example, by minimising unnecessary costs on smaller businesses and ensuring efficient
collection of contributions from companies based overseas.
Final policy position: Ofcom will be given powers to raise the required income to cover the
costs of running the online harms regime from industry.
3.21 Ofcom will be able to raise the required income to cover the costs of running the online
harms regime through industry fees. Ofcom will also have the power to require a company to
undertake, and pay for, a skilled person report.
Notification and the Annual Fee
3.22 Companies above a threshold based on global annual revenue will be required to notify
the regulator and pay an annual fee. Companies below the threshold will not be required to
notify the regulator or pay a fee. The threshold will be set by Ofcom, based on consultation
with industry, and will be signed off by Ministers. Companies in scope which fall below the
threshold will still have to comply with all their other regulatory responsibilities. The regulator
will, in consultation with industry, prescribe the details of the notification process, including the
information required from the company at the point of notification.
3.23 The total amount of fees to be charged to industry will be in proportion to the costs 
incurred by the regulator in operating the online harms regime. The fees to be paid by
individual companies will be tiered. The intention is that the regulator will calculate the fees
based on two metrics: a primary metric of global annual revenue; and a secondary optional
metric based on company activity. The details of the second metric will be determined by the
regulator and could be calculated using criteria such as the presence of specific functions on
a service. The metrics used to calculate the fees will meet the strict criteria of proportionality,
affordability and objectivity.
3.24 The government will give consideration to how all costs will be managed within this
funding regime, including the litigation costs of the regulator and will work to ensure that the
regulator remains cost neutral to the taxpayer.
3.25 As detailed in the section on Information gathering and Investigation, the regulator will
have the power to require a skilled person report on specific issues of concern.
3.26 When the regulator uses this power, the company will always be required to cover the
direct costs of the skilled person report. The regulator will consider the use of alternative
powers to obtain information it needs, if it determines that paying for the skilled person report




   
 
           
        
        
     
 
   
          
          
 
             
             
       
  
 
        
        
        
     
       
    
      
         
      
             
            
         
         
          
        
             
            
    
            
         
        
            
     
       
          
          
            
Interface with other bodies
White Paper: The White Paper stated that the government and regulator will need to work
closely with a number of other organisations, both domestic and international, to ensure the
successful implementation of the online harms regime. For example, industry bodies, other
regulators, law enforcement and overseas bodies.
Consultation responses and stakeholder engagement: The consultation responses
showed strong support for coordination and cooperation across regulators. The emphasis
was on UK based regulators as the questions did not reference international engagement.
Final policy position: The government will work with Ofcom to ensure that the regulator is
able to work effectively with a range of organisations. This will be delivered through a range
of means including co-designation powers, memorandums of understanding, forums and
networks.
3.27 The online harms regulator will need to have a large number of relationships with other
organisations, including regulators, government bodies, the devolved administrations, public
agencies, industry bodies, law enforcement and civil society. Ofcom already has a strong
network of relationships with a range of bodies and will continue to cultivate these both at
home and internationally. These relationships allow Ofcom to draw on the expertise within
other bodies whilst maintaining its own independence.
3.28 These relationships, variously underpinned by memorandums of understanding, forums
and networks, will support the regulator in understanding the prevalence of and impact of
online harms and the effectiveness of companies’ responses. Relationships with civil society
will be critical to ensure the regulator understands the needs of different user groups. In turn,
this will help ensure that the regulatory framework adequately keeps pace with the online
threat. Furthermore, Ofcom will play a critical role in enforcement across borders, and will rely
on its good relationships with its international counterparts to facilitate obtaining information
from other jurisdictions, and to achieve a degree of international regulatory alignment.
3.29 Ofcom will have the power to co-designate other bodies to deliver aspects of the
regulatory framework to make use of the significant expertise that sits outside Ofcom. The
government will work with Ofcom to understand where this may be effective and beneficial to
delivering the regulatory framework.
3.30 It will also be important to ensure that the regulator and law enforcement are able to 
share information with each other as appropriate to support the delivery of their functions.
Ofcom will need to build strong working relationships with law enforcement and other agencies
in order to, among other things, develop their understanding of, and take effective action
against, online terrorism and extremism.
3.31 Ofcom has strong existing relationships with other regulators such as the Information
Commissioner’s Office and the Competition and Markets Authority. On 1st July 2020, the
Competition and Markets Authority, Information Commissioner’s Office and Ofcom announced




       
           
      
        
 
            
            
    
          
        
         
 
  
UK. The Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum aims to strengthen existing collaboration and
coordination between the three regulators by harnessing their collective expertise when data,
privacy, competition, communications and content interact. Ofcom will work closely with these
and other regulatory bodies to coordinate various aspects of digital regulation including online
harms.
3.32 The decision to appoint Ofcom as the regulator for online harms is part of a wider
programme of work the government is undertaking to ensure the regulatory landscape for
digital technologies is coherent, effective and efficient.
3.33 The government will continue to review and assess the regulatory landscape as new
powers across our digital regulation programme are proposed. Where necessary, the









    
 
   
         
          
        
       
  
 
          
        
   
         
            
     
            
         
  
        
           
    
   
          
       
          
       
 
          
  
 
        
           
  
 
         
    
 
         
         
    
 
         
            
       
 
Part 4: Functions of the regulator
Summary
Consultation questions covered in Part 4:
❖ This government has committed to annual transparency reporting. Beyond the
measures set out in the White Paper, should the government do more to build a
culture of transparency, trust and accountability across industry and, if so, how?
❖ Should designated bodies be able to bring ‘super-complaints’ to the regulator in
specific and clearly evidenced circumstances? In what circumstances should this 
happen?
❖ What, if any, other measures should the government consider for users who wish to
raise concerns about specific pieces of harmful content or activity, and/or breaches 
of the duty of care?
❖ Should the regulator be empowered to i) disrupt business activities, or ii) undertake
ISP blocking, or iii) implement a regime for senior management liability? What, if any,
further powers should be available to the regulator? 
❖ Should the regulator have the power to require a company based outside the UK
and EEA to appoint a nominated representative in the UK or EEA in certain 
circumstances?
❖ In addition to judicial review should there be a statutory mechanism for companies 
to appeal against a decision of the regulator, as exists in relation to Ofcom under
sections 192-196 of the Communications Act 2003? In what circumstances should 
companies be able to use this statutory mechanism? Should the appeal be decided 
on the basis of the principles that would be applied on an application for judicial
review or on the merits of the case?
❖ What, if any, advice or support could the regulator provide to businesses, particularly 
start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises, to comply with the regulatory
framework?
❖ What further steps could be taken to ensure the regulator will act in a targeted and
proportionate manner?
● The regulator’s primary objective will be to improve safety for users of online
services. It will undertake regulatory action in line with the principles of the regulatory 
framework.
● The regulator will set out what companies need to do to fulfil the duty of care,
including through codes of practice.
● The regulator will have the power to require certain companies in scope to publish 
annual transparency reports, which will empower users to make informed decisions 
about which services they use.
● The regulator will be able to access information about companies’ redress
mechanisms in the exercise of its statutory functions, and will accept complaints from




     
      
        
        
      
 
           
     
   
 
     
 
       
             
            
            
 
 
                
          
   
           
 
          
          
  
           
  
         
      
 
            
         
 
            
                
      
        
             
     
 
          
         
    
 
 
● The regulator will have a super-complaints function, and will accept super-
complaints when there is substantial evidence of a systemic issue affecting large 
numbers of people, or specific groups of people. The regulator will also establish 
appropriate mechanisms for user advocacy, to ensure users’ experiences and
concerns are being heard and acted upon.
● The regulator will have a range of robust enforcement powers to tackle non-
compliance by in-scope companies providing services to UK users, to ensure the
effectiveness of the regime.
Duties on and functions of the regulator
4.1 The regulator will have certain duties and functions under the framework. Its primary duty
will be to improve the safety of users of online services (and that of non-users who may be
directly affected by others’ use of them). Regulatory action should be undertaken in line with
the principles of the regulatory framework (see Annex A), which means being realised in a
way that:
● is based on the risk of content or activity online harming individuals, where it gives rise
to a reasonably foreseeable risk of a significant adverse physical or psychological
impact on individuals;
● is reasonable and proportionate to the severity of the potential harm and resources
available to companies;
● provides a higher level of protection for children than for adults;
● protects users’ rights, including to freedom of expression and privacy online; and
safeguards media freedom;
● promotes transparency about and accountability for the incidence of and response to
harm;
● supports innovation and reduces the burden on business; and
● is delivered by putting in place appropriate systems and processes.
4.2 Ofcom, as the regulator, will need to apply these principles when it issues codes of practice
which will set out steps companies can take to fulfil the duty of care.
4.3 In addition to the above, Ofcom will also need to pay due regard to innovation in the
exercise of all of its functions, and it will have a further responsibility to help all companies to
understand and fulfil their responsibilities. This will involve providing appropriate support to 
companies depending on their size and maturity, with greater help for small and medium-sized
enterprises. It will also be required to assess the impact of its regulatory activities on business,
and in particular small and micro businesses.
4.4 Under the online harms regime Ofcom will have a duty to consider the vulnerability of
children and of others whose circumstances appear to Ofcom to put them in need of special








              
   
    
     
             
          
     
       
 
         
 
       
      
        
  
       
          
  
         
        
          
          
      
        
            
            
            
        
 
 
          
            
        
           
             
 
 
            
         
             
  
Box 16: Regulator role and functions
The regulator’s role and functions will include:
● Setting out what companies need to do to fulfil the duty of care, including through
codes of practice.
● Establishing a transparency, trust and accountability framework.
● Requiring all in-scope companies to have effective and accessible mechanisms for
users to report concerns and seek redress for alleged harmful content or activity
online, infringement of rights, or a company’s failure to fulfil its duty of care. 
● Assessing and responding to super-complaints.
● Establishing user advocacy mechanisms to understand users' concerns and 
experiences.
● Taking prompt and effective enforcement action in the event of non-compliance,
when it is appropriate and proportionate.
● Providing support to start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises to help them
fulfil their legal obligations in a proportionate and effective manner.
● Promoting education and awareness-raising about online safety to empower users
to stay safe online.
● Undertaking and commissioning research to improve our understanding of online
harms, their impacts on individuals and society and how they can be tackled.
Codes of practice
4.5 The government will set objectives for the regulator’s codes of practice in secondary
legislation to provide clarity for the framework. Ofcom will have a duty to consult interested
parties on the development of the codes of practice, which is consistent with usual regulatory
practice. It will also be required to consult bodies, organisations and interests specified in
legislation who have specific knowledge and expertise relating to the policy objectives, or who
have a significant interest in the online harms regime. The government will require the
regulator to undertake impact assessments for both new codes of practice and for revisions
to existing codes. As referenced at paragraph 3.20, this will include a specific requirement to
assess the impact of codes of practice on small and micro businesses. This will help to ensure
regulatory requirements are proportionate and that they do not place an undue burden on
businesses.
4.6 There will not be individual codes of practice for each specific harm; it will be for the
regulator to decide which codes of practice to produce. There are some exceptions to this,
where codes of practice will need to be more focussed. For example, there will be individual
codes of practice on tackling terrorist use of the internet, and on child sexual exploitation and
abuse. This reflects the requirement on companies to take particularly robust action on these
issues.
4.7 The government will maintain levers to ensure that the policy intent of the framework is
upheld and that evidence and expertise from government and law enforcement agencies is






             
      
        
            
              
           
 
      
          
              
           
         
   
 
             
      
            
      
    
  
         
        
       
 
       
         
 
             
        
       
             
       
 
                 
     
            
    
    
 
        
       
         
              
         
4.8 Ministers will have the power to issue a direction to reject a draft code for reasons relating
to government policy. Ministers would, where appropriate, publish the letter of direction to the
regulator, which would also set out modifications the regulator must make when revising the
code. The power could be used only at the end of the drafting process when the codes are
submitted by Ofcom to the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and the
Home Secretary. Ofcom will be responsible and accountable for all the codes of practice.
4.9 The Home Secretary will have additional powers in relation to the codes of practice on
preventing terrorist use of the internet and child sexual exploitation and abuse. The Home
Secretary will be able to require the regulator to review the codes of practice on child sexual
exploitation and abuse, and terrorist content and activity. This reflects the Home Secretary’s
responsibility for national security and the government’s response to online child sexual
exploitation and abuse.
4.10 To ensure proper parliamentary scrutiny of the codes, the objectives will be debated and
voted on in Parliament under the affirmative resolution procedure. The individual codes, and
any subsequent material amendments to them, will also be laid in Parliament and will be
subject to the negative resolution procedure. Doing this will enable greater flexibility to respond
to emerging threats and changing behaviours.
Promoting innovation
White Paper: The White Paper proposed that the regulator should have a legal duty to pay
due regard to innovation, to ensure competition within regulatory markets, and to help
companies find more efficient ways of working with the regulator.
Consultation responses and stakeholder engagement: Engagement suggested that
there is significant appetite for government influence and advocacy to support innovation.
Final policy position: Ofcom, as the independent online harms regulator, must already pay
due regard to encouraging innovation and promoting competition in relevant markets when
performing its duties, as set out in section 3(4)(d) of the Communications Act 2003. A
comparable duty to pay due regard to promoting innovation in relation to online harms will
be put in place by the new legislation.
4.11 The White Paper set out that the regulator should have a legal duty to pay due regard to
innovation, to ensure competition within regulatory markets and to help companies find more
efficient ways of working with the regulator. Since the White Paper the government has
undertaken additional work with industry and third sector stakeholders to understand how this
duty can best be delivered.
4.12 The Communications Act 2003 establishes that Ofcom must pay due regard to 
encouraging innovation. A comparable duty to pay due regard to promoting innovation will
also apply to Ofcom’s implementation of the regulatory framework around online harms, and
will be underpinned by a new statutory duty requiring Ofcom to publish information setting out







             
          
          
            
         
 
      
      
        
        
        
   
 
      
          
         
    
 
            
       
          
        
            
  
 
        
             
        
 
           
        
    
 
         
            
              
           
          
      
 
         
           
       
          
Transparency
White Paper: The White Paper set out that developing a culture of transparency, trust and
accountability will be a critical element of the new regulatory framework. It stated that
companies in scope will be required to publish annual transparency reports. These reports
will include, for example, information about the prevalence of harmful content or activity on
their services and what measures are being taken to address it.
Consultation responses and stakeholder engagement: Respondents to the consultation
and stakeholders highlighted the importance of transparency in holding companies to
account for enforcement of their own standards, and upholding freedom of expression.
Industry respondents suggested that transparency requirements should be proportionate –
noting that a ‘one size fits all’ approach was unlikely to be effective and could be costly to
implement for smaller companies.
Final policy position: The future transparency reporting requirements are in line with the
proposals set out in the White Paper. The future framework will be future-proof and
proportionate, and will give Ofcom the flexibility to determine the specific information
companies will need to provide.
The Government Report on Transparency Reporting in relation to Online Harms: The
government established a multi-stakeholder Transparency Working Group, which includes
representatives from civil society and industry. This group produced recommendations on
the future transparency framework, which the government has set out in The Government
Report on Transparency Reporting in relation to Online Harms published alongside the Full
Government Response.
4.13 The regulatory framework will improve transparency about the processes that companies
have in place to keep users safe. This will help to ensure that Ofcom, users and civil society
understand the decisions that companies are making and can hold them to account.
4.14 Transparency reporting will help empower users to make informed decisions about their
online activity. By highlighting the steps that companies are taking to keep their users safe,
these reports will help drive industry accountability and encourage action from companies.
4.15 Companies providing Category 1 services (see Part 2 for further details) will be required
to publish reports containing information about the steps they are taking to tackle online harms
on these services. The Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport will also have
the power to extend the scope of companies who will be required to publish transparency
reports, beyond Category 1 companies, by setting additional thresholds based on factors such
as the functionalities and the audience of the service. 
4.16 It is likely that the information that will be most useful to the regulator and to users will
vary between different companies. To ensure that the transparency framework is proportionate
and reflects the diversity of services in scope, the transparency reporting requirements will




         
  
 
    
          
            
          
 
          
      
 
         
 
          
      
           
          
       
         
      
        
       
          
       
         
    
           
       
         
     
      
          
            
         
      
        
      
 
          
       
          
        
        
 
            
              
         
capacity, service type and audience in determining what information they will need to include
in their reports.
4.17 Furthermore, to ensure that the transparency reporting framework is agile and future-
proof, the regulator will need flexibility in determining the specific information companies will
need to provide. The legislation will set out a list of the types of information that the regulator
may require companies to report on, relating to a number of areas.
4.18 An indicative list of the high level categories of information that companies might need to
include in their transparency reports is set out in Box 17 below.
Box 17: What types of information will transparency reports cover?
● Information about the enforcement of the company’s own relevant terms and
conditions, which should reflect the regulator’s codes of practice.
● Information about the processes that the company has in place for reporting harmful
content and activity (including in relation to illegal harms), the number of reports
received and the action taken as a result.
● Information about the processes and tools in place to address illegal and harmful
content and activity, including, where appropriate, tools to identify, flag, block or 
remove illegal and harmful content and the processes that companies have in place
for directing users to support and information.
● Information about the measures and safeguards in place to uphold and protect
fundamental rights, ensuring decisions to remove content, block and/or delete 
accounts are well founded, especially when automated tools are used, and that users
have an effective route of appeal.
● Where relevant, information about evidence of cooperation with UK law enforcement
and other relevant government agencies, regulatory bodies and public agencies.
● Information about measures to support user education and awareness of online
harms and strengthen users’ media literacy, including through collaboration with civil
society, small and medium-sized enterprises and other companies.
● Information about tools for users to help them manage harmful content and activity.
● Information about the process and steps an organisation has in place to assess risk
of harm at the design, development and update stage of the online service.
● Information about other steps that companies are taking to tackle online harms and 
fulfil their obligations under the online harms framework, including to deliver a higher
level of protection to children where a platform is likely to be accessed by children.
4.19 The indicative list has been informed by the recommendations in the first Government
Report on Transparency Reporting in relation to Online Harms, published alongside this
response. The Report sets out the recommendations produced by the multi-stakeholder
Transparency Working Group on what transparency reporting should look like, both as part of
the future regulatory framework but also in the interim period.
4.20 Where the regulator has determined that a company should report and set out what they 
will need to report on, the company will be required to do so or will face enforcement action.




        
 
            
           
            
      
  
    
 
        
          
          
 
 
      
        
          
       
         
     
 
          




       
 
         
         
        
   
 
        
        
 
         
           
      
 
              
      
          
        
     
regulator will publish guidance to provide further clarity to companies on its approach.
4.21 The regulator will be responsible for producing an annual report of its own which will
summarise key findings and insights from the reports that companies have produced and will
highlight good practice. This report will play a vital role in helping users and parents understand
the differences between online services and make informed decisions about which ones they
use.
Information gathering and Investigation
White Paper: The White Paper set out that the transparency, trust and accountability
framework would be backed by information gathering powers, to enable Ofcom to assess
companies’ compliance with the duty of care and develop its understanding of the risk 
landscape.
Consultation responses and stakeholder engagement: Respondents to the consultation
did not answer specifically on information gathering and investigation powers but highlighted
the importance of transparency in holding companies to account for enforcement of their
own standards. Many stakeholders recognised the importance of equipping the regulator
with the powers needed to determine whether companies are fulfilling the duty of care and
emphasised that these powers should be used proportionately.
Final policy position: The regulator will have powers to require additional information from
companies to inform its regulatory activity, including additional powers to support
investigations.
Information gathering powers and powers to support investigation
4.22 The regulator’s information gathering powers will play a crucial role in supporting its
various regulatory functions. These powers will help the regulator build an in-depth
understanding of the online harms landscape, prioritise its activity and oversee companies’
compliance with the regulatory framework.
4.23 The regulator will have a broad power to require the information that it needs to carry out
its functions. This will give Ofcom the flexibility to determine the specific information it requires. 
4.24 This power will apply to companies in scope of the duty of care and, where necessary, to
other organisations or persons who may have relevant information. The regulator will be
required to take a proportionate approach in exercising its powers.
4.25 Ofcom will use information from a wide range of sources to help prioritise its investigation
and enforcement activity. Alongside the information which companies have provided (in their
transparency reports and in response to information requests) the regulator will also utilise
user complaints data and publicly available information to help determine whether an





         
         
         
        
        
 
         
        
 
       
            
        
         
     
 
    
 
       
           
     
    
 
        
             
      
        
 
            
      
       
           
             
   
   
     
    
           
      
        
   
          
 
  
4.26 The regulator will also have a number of additional powers to support its oversight and
enforcement activity. Where there are reasonable grounds to suggest that a company may be
non-compliant, Ofcom will have the power to enter companies’ premises and access
documentation, data and equipment in order to understand whether companies are taking
sufficient measures to fulfil the duty of care.
4.27 Ofcom will also have a power to interview employees, which will allow it to develop further
understanding of how the company is complying with the duty of care.
4.28 Finally, Ofcom will have the power to require a company to undertake, and pay for, a
skilled person report on specific issues of concern. This power will be particularly useful on
issues where external technical expertise is needed, for instance to validate the effectiveness
of automated moderation systems. As with all its powers, Ofcom will be required to take a
proportionate approach to the use of this power.
Researcher access to company data
4.29 To support research into online harms, and to help the regulator to prioritise its actions,
Ofcom will be required to produce a report on the opportunities, challenges and practicalities
of companies providing independent researchers with access to company data to support
research into online harms.
4.30 As part of this Ofcom will produce best practice guidance for companies and researchers
on how to approach it. In preparing this guidance, Ofcom will be required to consult a broad
range of stakeholders, including companies, academics, the Information Commissioner’s
Office, the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation, UK Research and Information.
Box 18: Ahead of the research activity that Ofcom will undertake, the Department for Digital,
Culture, Media and Sport will deliver a comprehensive package to help inform and shape
our work on online harms. This includes: 
● an award of £2.6m between 2020-21 and 2021-22 from HM Treasury’s Shared
Outcomes Fund for a project to address current barriers to data sharing and to
improve data interoperability to support innovation and competition in the detection 
of online harms;
● a phased study to investigate the feasibility of research to assess the drivers and
impact of online harms;
● research into the impact on business and operational concerns surrounding the
implementation of the UK-established video sharing platform regulatory regime;
● research that will consider the possible exclusion risks posed by age assurance
solutions to vulnerable children;







            
        
         
  
 
    
     
           
       
      
 
           
          
     
       
 
       
       
        
       
       
      
 
      
           
            
       
           
     
 
     
          
       
           
       
    
 
         
          
       
     
 
          
        
User redress
White Paper: The White Paper committed to ensuring measures are in place for users to
seek redress, and consulted on a proposed super-complaints framework. It also noted that
users would be able to alert the regulator to their concerns, and use regulatory decisions in 
legal proceedings. 
Consultation responses and stakeholder engagement: Organisations overwhelmingly
agreed that companies should have effective, accessible and transparent mechanisms for
reporting harmful content and felt that current processes often fell short. They agreed that
this process should start with reports directly to the service, and noted the importance of
making these mechanisms accessible and prominent for all users, including children.
Final policy position: As detailed in Part 2, companies will be required to have reporting
and redress mechanisms. The regulator will have oversight of these mechanisms. Ofcom
will also establish a super-complaints function and user advocacy mechanisms to ensure it
is understanding users’ experiences, detecting issues early and addressing their concerns.
4.31 As detailed in Part 2, all companies in scope will be required to have effective and
accessible user reporting and redress mechanisms for the types of content and activity which
they have to address as part of their duty of care. They will also be required to have
mechanisms for users to report broader concerns about a company’s compliance with its
duties. The regulator will be able to access information about companies’ reporting and 
redress mechanisms in the exercise of its statutory functions.
4.32 In addition to users being able to report their concerns to services, they will also be able
to report their concerns to the regulator. However, the regulator will not investigate or arbitrate
on individual cases. Allowing the regulator to do so would conflict with the principle of a
systems and processes approach, and the number of potential complaints could overwhelm
it. Instead, receiving user complaints will be an essential part of Ofcom’s horizon-scanning,
research, supervision and enforcement activity.
4.33 The government does not intend to establish an independent resolution mechanism, such
as an ombudsman or certified Alternative Dispute Resolution scheme, for users to seek
individual redress independently of companies. Such mechanisms are relatively untested in
areas of non-financial harm. It is unclear how they would work in practice for online harms
disputes, which centre on complex issues of safety and users’ rights, or whether they would 
be valuable to users.
4.34 Establishing an independent mechanism for resolving disputes would not align with our
overarching objective to ensure companies take more responsibility for their users’ safety, and
to improve users’ trust in their processes. It could disincentivise cultural change within
companies, and encourage companies to ‘offload’ difficult content decisions externally.
4.35 The government and the regulator will continue to assess evidence as the new framework




      
             
        
 
   
  
          
        
           
     
      




         
            
             
     
 
         
           
         
           
           
     
      
          




       
        
           
            
         
   
 
      
          
          
           
          
review on the effectiveness of the regime 2-5 years after entry into force. This will offer an
opportunity to re-assess whether the case for a statutory independent review mechanism is
stronger, when the regulatory framework is better established.
Legal action by individuals
4.36 The regulatory framework will not establish new avenues for individuals to sue
companies. However, the existing legal rights individuals have to bring actions against
companies will not be affected. As outlined in the White Paper, the government expects legal
action to become more accessible to users as the evidence base around online harms grows,
and as regulatory precedent is established. Users will be able to use regulatory decisions that
are publicly available as evidence in any relevant legal action they pursue.
Super-complaints
4.37 As proposed in the White Paper, a super-complaints function will ensure that there is an
avenue for organisations representing users or those who are affected by harmful content and
activity online (for example, victims of child sexual exploitation and abuse) to alert Ofcom to
their concerns about systemic issues.
4.38 Under this function, Ofcom will accept super-complaints demonstrating substantial
evidence of a systemic issue that is causing harm, or risks causing harm, to large numbers of
users or specific groups of users. This will include those who may suffer disproportionately 
from online harms. Super-complaints will need to focus on the systems and processes that
companies have in place, rather than any specific content issues. They will also need to focus
on issues occurring across multiple in-scope services, as organisations can raise concerns
about a single company’s conduct through Ofcom’s enforcement complaints processes.
However, recognising the dominance of some services, super-complaints regarding one
service will be admissible in exceptional circumstances. 
User advocacy
4.39 Ofcom will also have a legal duty to establish ongoing mechanisms for user advocacy.
These will ensure it understands the experiences of service users (including children) and 
others who are affected by harmful content and activity online (for example, victims of online
child sexual exploitation and abuse), and that it can take action to address their concerns. It
will also allow Ofcom to become aware of issues at an early stage before they can cause 
significant harm.
4.40 Ofcom will have discretion to determine appropriate user advocacy mechanisms, which
may include expert panels, research, user panels or focus groups. This flexibility will ensure it
is able to use the most appropriate methods for understanding users’ concerns and
experiences, and to encourage innovation in advocacy models. Ofcom will be required to







           
           
        
 
      
           
        
     
 
         
           
        
         
   
 
          
      
          
            
          
         
            
              
 
         
             
         
             
          
 
      
         
                 
          
             
      
         
          
       
            
              
       
Enforcement
White Paper: The White Paper set out that the regulator will have a range of enforcement
powers to take action against companies that fail to fulfil their duty of care. It recognised that
the powers must incentivise compliance and be used in a proportionate manner.
Consultation responses and stakeholder engagement: Stakeholder feedback
expressed an overall preference for the regulator to begin its operations by supervising
companies and supporting compliance through advice, and that any further enforcement
measures should be used proportionately and following a clear process.
Final policy position: The principles and objectives underlying the enforcement proposals
have not changed fundamentally, but the government has provided further details on what
enforcement activity will look like. This includes refining the additional enforcement powers
that the government consulted on. The most notable developments are in our approach to 
nominated representatives, senior management liability and business disruption measures.
4.41 The approach to enforcement will aim to encourage compliance and drive positive cultural
change. The regulator will support businesses to help them understand the expectations
placed on them, and how the regulator’s use of its enforcement powers will be proportionate.
Ofcom will have a suite of enforcement powers available to use against companies who fail to
fulfil the duty of care, or fail to put in place appropriate measures after being alerted to an
issue. These powers will be comparable to those already used by Ofcom and other UK
regulators. Ofcom will use its enforcement powers in line with its duties, including being
proportionate, taking into account the level of harm and considering the impact on children.
4.42 The government recognises the need to balance effective enforcement with protecting
the attractiveness of the UK as a tech sector, and also with users’ rights. The regulator will
strongly encourage compliance with the regime in the first instance and provide clear grounds
for any intervention and escalation. The focus will be on ensuring that companies have
compliant systems and processes in place, rather than on specific pieces of content.
4.43 The regulator’s enforcement powers will include issuing directions for improvement and
notices of non-compliance. Ofcom will have the power to issue sanctions in the form of civil
fines up to £18 million or 10% of annual global turnover, whichever is higher. The fine limit is
in line with the limits for those fines currently issued by Ofcom, the Financial Conduct Authority
and the Competition and Markets Authority. As a last resort in cases of repeated or particularly 
egregious non-compliance, Ofcom will be able to take measures to disrupt a company’s
business activities in the UK, including blocking access in the most serious circumstances. If
a company fails to fulfil their duty of care, the regulator may be able to pursue enforcement
action against a parent company that wholly owns or controls the non-compliant company.
Ofcom will take a proportionate approach to its enforcement activity and will be required to
consult and publish guidance setting out how the powers will be used. Further details of the





           
         
            
          
         
           
        
              
             
  
 
      
 
     
 
           
         
        
       
 
      
         
        
  
        
            
    
 
          
           
      
      
    
    
       
    
             
        
       
 
    
 
         
             
           
            
4.44 Alongside meeting their duty of care, companies in scope may also be required to provide
transparency reporting, respond to information requests, use automated technology to remove
illegal content (see paragraphs 2.54 to 2.70), notify the regulator in relation to the annual
industry fee and pay the annual fee. Further details of these requirements are set out in Parts
2, 3 and 4. The regulator will be able to take enforcement action against companies that fail
to comply with these requirements, using the powers set out in Box 19. In addition the regulator
may also require information from third parties that are not in scope (see paragraph 4.24). The
regulator will be able to issue fines against third parties that fail to comply. The regulator will
be required to produce guidance setting out how it will use the enforcement powers in these
circumstances.
Box 19: The regulator’s enforcement powers:
● The power to issue directions and notices of non-compliance. 
● Fines up to £18m or 10% of annual global turnover, whichever is higher:
○ The regulator will produce guidance on how penalties will be decided. The
guidance will be based on the regulator’s operating principles, including
proportionality and the extent to which harm was caused to children.
● Business Disruption Measures, Level One:
○ The regulator will have the power to take measures that make it less 
commercially viable for a non-compliant company to provide services to UK
users.
○ The regulator will have the power to require providers to withdraw access to
key services. If providers do not comply, the regulator will be able to enforce 
through a court order.
● Business Disruption Measures, Level Two (serious failures of the duty of care):
○ The regulator will have the power to take measures that block a non-
compliant company’s services from being accessible in the UK, by requiring 
the withdrawal of services by key internet infrastructure providers (e.g.
browsers, web-hosting companies, app stores, online security providers or 
Internet Service Providers).
○ This approach is technology neutral to encompass future changes to how the
architecture of the internet functions.
○ The regulator will be required to obtain a court order for Level Two sanctions 
ahead of requesting a provider to block access to the non-compliant 
company’s service in the UK, to safeguard freedom of expression online.
Enforcement in an international context
4.45 The White Paper set out that the regulatory regime will need to handle the global nature
of online harms and be designed in a way to ensure the regulator can take action against
companies without a legal presence in the UK. Ofcom should have powers to ensure a level




   
 
         
             
    
 
            
           
     
         




     
            
    
       
          
      
         





         
         
             
        
                 
             
           
            
             
         
       
                
        
      
 
 
              
            
        
entirely from overseas.
4.46 It will be possible for the regulator to take enforcement action against any company,
irrespective of where it is based in the world, if it provides services to UK users that are in
scope of the online harms regime.
4.47 The enforcement powers have been designed to be able to be used against companies
with and without a physical or legal presence in the UK. As other countries introduce similar
legislation, international cooperation will become an increasingly important and effective tool
for the regulator. The government expects the regulator to work with equivalent organisations
internationally to help foster collaboration.
Nominated representatives
4.48 The White Paper proposed that companies should have nominated representatives in
the UK or European Economic Area, to assist the regulator in taking enforcement action
against companies based outside of these areas. While respondents acknowledged that this
system would support the effectiveness of the proposed legislation, concerns were raised
about the potential impact on business costs and operations. These would be particularly
acute for smaller businesses. The government has decided not to proceed with this option.
Ofcom may choose to request names of individuals through the notification process to act as
a point of contact. Further details on the notification process are contained in the Funding
Model section.
Senior Management Liability
4.49 The government also consulted on whether senior managers should be personally liable
for failures to meet the duty of care. This emerged as an area of concern, with industry
highlighting the risk of potential negative impacts on the attractiveness of the UK tech sector.
Any sanctions for senior managers should support engagement with the regulatory framework.
It will be crucial for the regulator to have access to reliable and timely information, so it can
understand the impact of the regulation and how the duty of care is being met. Therefore the
government will reserve the right to introduce criminal sanctions for senior managers who fail
to respond fully, accurately, and in a timely manner, to information requests from the online
harms regulator. This power, and the associated criminal penalties for failing to comply, will
be consistent with Ofcom’s existing information gathering powers. This power would not be
introduced until at least two years after the regulatory framework comes into effect, based on
a review of the impact of the framework. The sanction would be a last resort, only to be used
if industry failed to meet their information sharing responsibilities. This approach balances
industry concerns with many stakeholders’ support for the proposal as a way to drive culture
change.
Appeals
White Paper: The White Paper set out that companies, and other individuals, will have the
ability to seek judicial review of the regulator’s actions and decisions through the High Court,




      
            
        
     
        
 
           
         
        
 
           
              
    
        
              
 
 
            
          
               
      
    
 
          
             
              
 
         
        
              
              
           
      
       
 
              
        
            
           
        
     
Consultation responses and stakeholder engagement: The government consulted on
whether there should be an additional statutory mechanism of appeal, who should be able
to access this, and what the circumstances and standard for appeals through this route
should be. Responses were broadly in support of a statutory mechanism in addition to 
judicial review, with the primary focus on it being affordable and accessible.
Final policy position: The government is now proceeding with the option of an additional
statutory mechanism for appeal, as considered in the consultation. Appeals will be possible 
to an appropriate tribunal, on the basis of judicial review principles. 
4.50 The government consulted on whether there should be a statutory mechanism for appeal,
in addition to the option of judicial review. Appeal mechanisms provide a route for the
regulator’s decisions to be challenged, which help make regulations more robust and fair.
Enforcement decisions are a particular area where it will be important to have an accessible
route of appeal, due to the novel nature of the regulations and the range of different companies
in scope.
4.51 The government will ensure that, in addition to judicial review through the High Court,
there is an additional statutory mechanism of review by designating an existing statutory body 
to review appeals. By using an existing statutory appeals body the regime will seek to save
costs, and to reduce the financial burden on smaller businesses and interested third parties
who wish to appeal decisions.
4.52 Appeals to an appropriate tribunal on the regulator’s decisions will be on the basis of
judicial review principles. This means that the tribunal will assess the legality of the decision
and the process used to make it, rather than conducting a review of the merits of a decision.
4.53 The government recognises that consultation responses expressed a preference for a
merits-based appeal process. The regulator will have the knowledge and expertise to
determine the facts of the individual case. Rather than an appeals body seeking to gather and
review these facts again, it will be best used to determine whether Ofcom has exercised its
powers lawfully and fairly. The government is confident that an appeal using judicial review
principles will offer both expediency, and appropriate levels of oversight of regulatory
decisions, without undermining the regulator’s decision making authority.
4.54 Any party with sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates will be able
to appeal Ofcom’s decisions and sanctions, in line with judicial review standards. The
government understands that a number of stakeholders will have an interest in the decisions
of the regulator, including industry, civil society groups, and users. This approach is in line with
international standards and is an important safeguard to ensure the regulator acts in








   
       
          
  
        
     
         
   
          
 
 
       
           
            
        
 
        
       
              
      
 
            
          
      
       
   
 
          
     
        
  
 
      
         







Part 5: What part will technology, education and awareness play in
the solution?
Summary
Consultation questions covered in Part 5:
❖ What are the greatest opportunities and barriers for (i) innovation and (ii) adoption of 
safety technologies by UK organisations, and what role should the government play 
in addressing these?
❖ What, if any, are the most significant areas in which organisations need practical
guidance to build products that are safe by design?
❖ Should the government be doing more to help people manage their own and their
children's safety and if so, what?
❖ What, if any, role should the regulator have in relation to education and awareness
activity?
● The regulatory framework will be supported by an ambitious programme of practical
support for the tech industry, which will put in place the guidance, tools and support
needed to create safer online experiences for users. A renewed focus on media
literacy will ensure users are better able to manage risks.
● The UK is a world-leading provider of ‘safety technology’ - products and services that
help to deliver safer user experiences. The government will continue to support the
growth of this sector, so that firms of all sizes have access to the technology they
need to protect their users and comply with regulation.
● The government will develop a safety by design framework that will provide guidance
for industry on how to build safer online products and services from the outset. It will
encourage companies to actively consider the safety implications of their design
decisions, and will be tailored to support companies with a range of digital skills and 
subject knowledge.
● The government and the regulator, working with industry, will both play a role in
equipping users with the skills they need to manage risks online and critically
appraise information. This will include publication by the government of a new online
media literacy strategy.
● The government’s approach will include building upon the interactions between
safety by design and media literacy, to promote the role of design in strengthening






              
          
    
        
     
 
    
             
          
    
         
           
    
         
       
         
           
 
        
            
       
          
 
           
             
        
         
        
         
   
 
          
        
         
          
          
      
           
         
       
 





White Paper: The White Paper set out the government's ambition to position the UK as a
world leader in safety technology. It proposed specific action to assess the online safety 
sector’s capability and potential, and to explore how organisations can securely access 
training data to develop Artificial Intelligence solutions while ensuring that Artificial
Intelligence use is safe and ethical.
Consultation responses and stakeholder engagement: The government has consulted
with a wide range of stakeholders from across industry and civil society, to understand the
potential for growth of the safety technology sector. Key themes emerging were the
opportunities for government to:
● support a data infrastructure that enables greater innovation and competition in
safety technology, for example by improving access to datasets that can be used for
training Artificial Intelligence solutions;
● champion the emerging UK safety tech sector, including through growing
international trade and improving sector access to funding sources;
● strengthen networks for collaboration within the safety tech sector and with the wider
tech sector, and use insight from sector providers to inform policy development.
Final policy position: Since the White Paper, the government has published a detailed
analysis of the UK safety tech innovation ecosystem, ‘Safer technology, safer users: the UK
as a world leader in Safety Tech’, and announced a package of measures to work towards
making the UK a world leader in safety technology. (See ‘Upcoming measures’ below).
5.1 The government's aim is to ensure that all companies have access to the technologies
and tools they need to support safer online communities. The White Paper set out that the
government will work closely with the technology sector including industry, academia and civil
society to make the UK a world leader in innovative technology solutions to prevent child
sexual exploitation and abuse, terrorism and other harmful behaviours. The regulator will use
its position to drive the development of new technologies and support the sharing of tools and
best practice across companies.
5.2 Since the White Paper, the government has conducted a detailed study into the safety
tech market. These findings, published in the ‘Safer technology, safer users: the UK as a world 
leader in Safety Tech’ report in May 2020,44 demonstrate that UK safety tech providers are at
the cutting edge of technology development, offering products that are helping to protect
millions of users worldwide. This market is also increasingly interesting for investors; the sector
has seen annual growth rates of 35% in recent years, with revenues predicted to exceed £1
billion by the mid 2020s. Internationally, UK companies have around 25% of global market
share, and the sector employs around 1,700 Full Time Employees across the UK, including in
regional hubs in London, Cambridge, Leeds and Edinburgh.45 
44 ‘Safer technology, safer users: The UK as a world-leader in Safety Tech’ UK Government, May
2020 (last viewed in November 2020)
45 ‘Safer technology, safer users: The UK as a world-leader in Safety Tech’ UK Government, May





      
          
        
            
      
    
 
       
         
 
        
        
        
   




           
            
 
            
 
           
 
            
     
  
            
       
 
 
         
         
 
       
 
        
     
  
 
        




5.3 The government has also supported the launch of the UK Online Safety Technology 
Industry Association (OSTIA), a collective voice for the safety tech sector, which will help to
increase visibility of new innovations, new technology and best practice for online safety. In
August 2020, the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and the Department for
International Trade published a Directory of UK Safety Tech Providers,46 designed to help 
open up export markets.
5.4 To drive further sector growth, the government has also worked with stakeholders to
identify opportunities for government support, based on five key areas of focus:
● Promoting the industry in national and international markets;
● Strengthening mechanisms for collaboration within industry, and the public sector;
● Targeted investment - running growth programmes in areas of policy priority;
● Improving data infrastructure;
● Convening the industry to identify consistent standards and strategies.
Upcoming measures
5.5 The government will continue to explore a range of measures to support the rapid
development of the safety tech market. These are set out in Box 20, below.
Box 20: New measures to support the growth of the safety tech sector
To support the further growth of the UK safety tech sector, the government will:
● Deliver the Safety Tech Innovation Network, the world’s first forum for safety tech
providers to collaborate and promote their work;
● Deliver a new £2.6m project to prototype how better use of data around online harms
can lead to improved Artificial Intelligence systems, and deliver better outcomes for
citizens;
● Organise a series of events, including a Safety Tech Unconference and Expo, to
raise awareness and showcase the best of safety tech to potential buyers;
● Help to organise trade missions to priority safety tech export markets;
● Collaborate across sectors, including with the UK Online Safety Tech Industry
Association (www.ostia.org.uk), to identify opportunities for innovation, adoption 
and promotion of safety tech;
● Explore ways in which best practices in online safety can be included in standards 
and guidance for buying, building and reusing government technology, such as the





   
 
          
 
       
  
 
         
           
      
 
      
     
         
            
          
          
         
             
         
 
        
           
          
      
 
        
          
           
             
        
 
               
        
         
           
       
      
          
             
       
           
       
       
Technology Code of Practice;
● Develop a Safety Tech Sector Strategy, to guide future priorities for sector support.
Safety by design, media literacy and engaging with information
Safety by design
White Paper: The government committed to developing a safety by design framework to
make it easier for start-ups and small businesses to embed safety during the design,
development or updates of online products and services.
Consultation responses and stakeholder engagement: Stakeholders expressed broad
agreement and recognition that standards of safety are improved when organisations build 
in user safety at the design and development stage of their online products or services. It
was felt that greater guidance was needed on this, particularly for smaller companies. Whilst
it was agreed that user safety should be the priority of a whole organisation, currently there
is a notable gap in resources targeted at product designers, product managers and
developers. The responses highlighted the need for greater specificity on the objectives of
a safety by design approach and for the safety by design framework to be capable of
supporting companies with a range of digital skills and subject knowledge.
Final policy position: The government remains committed to supporting the safer design
of online products and services. The government intends to develop a framework of
guidance by Spring 2021 to provide support to product designers, product managers and
developers to help them adopt a safety by design approach.
5.6 The White Paper stated that the government would deliver a safety by design framework,
providing guidance to companies on how to design safer online products and services for
users, and especially children. Service and product design decisions can directly impact on
the likelihood of harms occurring online. It is therefore crucial that companies consider design
choices to prevent harm and improve the safety of users’ online experience. 
5.7 The government has set out that companies will be expected to provide a higher level of
protection to their child users, under the duty of care. The White Paper outlined the importance
of media literacy in empowering users to engage critically with what they encounter online. In
response to this, the safety by design framework will encourage companies to strengthen
users’ media literacy through design, provide particular protection to children and also reflect
the ongoing responsibility that services have to their users.
5.8 A safety by design approach can apply from the conception stage of a new business
onwards. User safety must be considered when designing the functionality of an online product
or service, but also applies to setting in place an organisation's objectives and culture to fully
support a safety by design approach. Companies should consider the impact of their design
choices at each stage of the design and development process. Examples of a safety by design




          
          
       
      
          
         
 
      
      
         
      
        
          
               
       
          
       
              
          
         
        
      




         
      
               
          
    
 
    
          
           
          
      
 
       
  
 
nudges and user reporting tools that are simple to use. Further practical examples of design
interventions taken by companies during the COVID-19 pandemic in response to
disinformation and misinformation content online are in Box 21, below.
5.9 The government’s safety by design framework will contain:
● High level design principles to guide product design and development work;
● Practical guidance for implementing safer design choices and effective safety
features;
● Examples of best practice and case studies on service design.
5.10 The consultation responses demonstrated that companies will have different
requirements from the safety by design framework depending on their knowledge of user
safety, online harms and service design. For example, some organisations are digitally
capable but lack the knowledge to identify and mitigate user safety risks. Others are informed
about online harms but have limited digital skills to implement effective changes.
5.11 The safety by design framework will be tailored to meet a range of different needs. The
government will engage with companies of different sizes, capabilities, and sectors to develop
and test it. The government will also work closely with technical experts, industry, academia
and civil society to ensure the right approach is adopted.
5.12 All companies, whatever their size, need to have the right tools to pre-empt and mitigate
the risk of misuse of their services. The safety by design framework will help designers and
developers consider the safety implications of their design decisions and incorporate existing
good practice into their products. This will support fulfillment of the duty of care, improve
standards of user safety and strengthen users’ media literacy. Responsibility for promoting
safety by design will ultimately pass to the regulator.
Media literacy
White Paper: In the White Paper the government committed to developing an online media 
literacy strategy for both adults and children. It also stated that industry and government
have a shared responsibility to empower users to manage their online safety. It set out that
the regulator will have oversight of industry activity and spend on education and awareness,
and a responsibility to promote online media literacy.
Consultation responses and stakeholder engagement: While some respondents felt that
the regulator should not have a role in education and awareness, others made a range of
suggestions for how the regulator might take specific action. These included overseeing
industry activity and spend; creating an evaluation framework for assessing education and
awareness activity; and promoting awareness of online safety.
Final policy position: The government will publish its forthcoming online media literacy 




          
             
     
 
         
           
       
           
     
 
      
         
        
            
          
         
           
 
    
        
          
 
           
       
          
         
   
 
    
 
            
    
     
 
       
 
      
       
    
           
    
         
   
        
        
    
 
5.13 Internet users want to feel empowered to manage their own online safety. However, as
the White Paper identified, many adults and children do not think there is adequate support in
place to understand the risks and feel vulnerable online as a consequence.
5.14 The government recognises the vital role that education can play in supporting children
and adults to navigate the online world safely. In England, the Department for Education has
introduced the statutory relationships, sex and health education curriculum (from September
2020), alongside the computing curriculum (from September 2014). Both support children to
navigate the online world safely.
5.15 The Department for Education has also brought in new national standards for essential
digital skills that set out the skills needed to operate effectively in life and work; ‘Being safe
and responsible online’ is one of the 5 skill areas. The department has introduced new digital
skills qualifications up to Level 1 that are based on these new standards, alongside a new
legal entitlement for adults with no or low digital skills to study these qualifications free of
charge. The government welcomes action already taken by companies, in partnership with
civil society, to develop education and awareness programmes for online users.
5.16 Despite this progress, more needs to be done to equip users with the skills they need to
spot risks online, critically appraise information and take steps to keep themselves and others
safe online. This includes supporting adults, including in their role as parents and carers.
5.17 To achieve this, the government made a number of commitments in the White Paper
which recognise that industry and government have a shared responsibility to empower users
to manage their online safety. The online harms regime will build on Ofcom’s existing
responsibilities and empower it to play an enhanced role in improving media literacy across
the board.
Role of Ofcom in media literacy
5.18 Ofcom has an existing statutory duty to promote media literacy under section 11 of the
Communications Act 2003, which is currently delivered through its media literacy research
and online research programme ‘Making Sense of Media’.
5.19 The online harms regime will build on this statutory duty and be designed so that Ofcom
can:
● Promote greater understanding of the public’s media literacy knowledge and skills 
through research, identifying key gaps and groups with the greatest need and ensuring
the public has access to current information;
● Develop a greater understanding of how service design choices strengthen users’
media literacy (see paragraphs 5.29-5.32 below);
● Develop and encourage others to develop educational initiatives which increase public
awareness and online safety;
● Support and encourage the evaluation of media literacy initiatives, including service
design choices and educational programmes, through the development and




         
     
        
            
          
     
 
             
            
        
              
         
       
  
 
           
    
 
    
 
        
            
         
     
 
          
       
          
           
      
 
            
            
         
             
       
     
 
      
          
         
       
     
 
          
     
           
5.20 Ofcom will be able to undertake a range of initiatives when it identifies an area in which
media literacy needs to be improved. This might include communications campaigns, piloting
targeted interventions and providing training to key services in the community (e.g. support
workers, community leaders). Ofcom will have independence to discharge its duties in this
regard, although the government may have views on the regulator’s priorities that the regulator
should take into account in determining its work.
5.21 Ofcom will also play a role in overseeing industry activity and spending on education and
awareness, as well as the impact of service design upon media literacy. This will be delivered
through the transparency reporting framework (see Part 4). Certain companies in scope may
be required to report on their education and awareness raising activity, to allow users to make
informed choices about their online activity and understand the support offered by different
services. It is also possible that companies may be asked to report on media literacy initiatives
specifically for children.
5.22 Although Ofcom will oversee industry activity, it will not have the power to direct industry
spend or activity.
Role of the government in media literacy
5.23 The government committed to publishing a new online media literacy strategy, after broad
consultation with stakeholders. The strategy will ensure a coordinated approach to online
media literacy education and awareness for children, young people and adults. The online
media literacy strategy will be published in spring 2021.
5.24 The government has consulted widely with stakeholders on the proposed strategy. It has
also undertaken a comprehensive landscape mapping exercise to identify what actions are
already underway, and to shape the objectives of the online media literacy strategy. Alongside
this, the government has considered research on the levels of media literacy among users,
and evaluated the evidence base for media literacy interventions.
5.25 The online media literacy strategy will focus on supporting users in managing their privacy
settings and their online footprint. It will help them think critically about the content they come
across online, including disinformation and misinformation, and how the terms and conditions
of services and moderating processes can be used to address harmful content. The strategy
will also acknowledge the importance of action from industry in ensuring that service design
strengthens users' media literacy skills.
5.26 The strategy is designed to deliver tailored outcomes for different groups. It is intended
to promote greater understanding of media literacy for children and young people, balancing
their enhanced digital skills with their increased vulnerability online. It will also support parents 
to improve their media literacy skills whilst caring for children, so they can better understand
and prevent the risk of harmful activity online.
5.27 The strategy will complement Ofcom’s work in media literacy, including Ofcom’s Making
Sense of Media programme, and existing initiatives. This includes, in England, the work the




            
       
 
       
      
             
   
 
          
 
        
       
        
      
 
       
           
          
         
   
 
           
                 
        
             
     
 
            
            
           
            
             
           
            
 
         
 
 
        
         
          
       
  
 
safety and digital literacy and the introduction of a new legal entitlement for adults with no or
low digital skills to study essential digital skills qualifications free of charge.
5.28 The government is working closely with the Devolved Administrations and with the seven
Mayoral Combined Authorities and the Greater London Authority, where adult skills funding is 
devolved to take account of their priorities and existing programmes of work in the online
media literacy strategy.
Engaging with information - how safety by design and media literacy work together
5.29 Service design and a user’s critical engagement with online content are closely
connected. They can either work together positively to improve a user’s safety and wellbeing
or can interact in a way that disempowers a user. Media literacy is influenced, in part, by the
design and interface of online services and products.
5.30 Online services and products can be designed in a way that limits the ability of users to
engage critically with online content. For example, a user journey that allows the user to
forward messages to an endless number of people risks limiting the user’s ability to critically
assess content, and leaves them more vulnerable to engaging with misinformation and
disinformation online.
5.31 However, service design can be harnessed to support and encourage a user’s critical
thinking. Good behavioural nudges can be used to prompt a user when they are at risk of
encountering or sharing content that is potentially harmful or incorrect. Fact-checked,
trustworthy content can be clearly marked and users can be provided with tools to manage
the content that they see.
5.32 The government’s approach to safety by design and media literacy aims to promote and
improve the impact that service design can have on strengthening users' media literacy skills.
The safety by design framework (see 5.9-5.12 above) will provide organisations with practical
guidance on how to design safer online services and products that empower users. As part of
this role, Ofcom will develop a greater understanding of how service design strengthens users'
media literacy skills. This dual approach will empower adult users to keep themselves safe
online and ensure companies consider the impact of their design choices on user safety.
Box 21: Engaging with information: the role of design in strengthening media 
literacy
The COVID-19 pandemic brought the danger of disinformation and misinformation content
online into sharp focus. In response to this, companies introduced new design
interventions focused on strengthening users’ media literacy. Nearly all the major social






        
  
 
    
● YouTube continues to remove content which denies the existence of COVID-19 or 
contradicts the World Health Organization or NHS medical information.47  The 
service also prohibits adverts published alongside content which promotes harmful 
health-related content, including anti-vaccination information.48   
 
● Facebook has expanded its work with fact-checkers to continue addressing 
misinformation. In March 2020, Facebook displayed warnings on roughly 40 million 
posts related to COVID-19, based on 4,000 articles reviewed by independent fact 
checkers. When users saw the warning labels, 95% of the time these users did not 
go on to visit the original content.49   
 
● Other services have also taken steps to improve users’ ability to find relevant 
information and improve their safety during COVID-19. Twitter serves “Know the 
facts” messaging to users who search for virus related information on the service, 
which directs users to the National Health Service website. They also provide a 
prompt for users who search for 5G content, directing them to government and 
authoritative sources of information.  
 
● Such measures demonstrate that small design changes can potentially have a 
significant impact on user behaviour online; in this case ensuring people can stay 
safe by being better informed over the content they view during the COVID-19 
pandemic.  
 
47 ‘COVID-19 Medical Misinformation Policy’ YouTube, May 2020 (last viewed in November 2020)
48 ‘Advertiser-friendly content guidelines: Controversial issues and sensitive events’ YouTube (last 
viewed in November 2020)












         
     
 
           
         
     
 
         
         
    
 
   
 
         
           
                
         
 
           
           
            
       
          
           
                   
           
     
 
       
       
         
         
           
             
     
 
      
 
     
 
Part 6: How does the regulatory framework fit into the wider digital
landscape?
Summary
● The online harms regulation is a key component of the government’s future work to
harness the opportunities of digital technology.
● Beyond online harms, the government is developing proposals in a range of areas
to improve online safety and security, support dynamic and competitive digital
markets and promote our democratic values online.
● The government’s digital strategy will set out how the government is bringing the
different strands of activity together in one place, as well as putting digital tech at the
heart of the response to COVID-19.
Wider digital strategy 
6.1 The government has announced that it will publish a new and ambitious digital strategy,
which will recognise the increased importance of digital technology and data in our lives, and
the crucial role it must play in the future. The strategy seeks to ensure that the UK maximises
the benefits of a tech-led recovery to the COVID-19 pandemic.
6.2 Pro-innovation governance, including regulation that builds trust and certainty, will be a
key component of a future strategy, supporting the government’s wider response to harness
digital opportunities arising in the digital age. The government is taking regulatory action in a
range of areas - including cyber security, competition, and protecting quality journalistic 
content - to improve online safety and security, support dynamic and competitive digital
markets, and promote our democratic values online. Within this, online harms regulation will
be a key part of the government’s ambition for the UK to be the safest place in the world to be
online, while taking a proportionate approach that promotes innovation - for example by
building up the safety tech sector.
6.3 The government will also ensure that its approach to governing digital technologies is
streamlined and coherent. Many of the harms relating to digital technologies have common
underlying drivers, such as market power and information asymmetry, and different
government interventions can often target the same companies. For example, action to tackle
online harms needs to be consistent with work to promote high quality journalism given their
shared focus on online content, consumer education, and the role of social media companies.
A holistic approach is therefore necessary.
Box 22: Examples of wider government regulatory action








             
            
           
        
● On 27 November 2020, the government announced it is establishing a new, pro-
competition regime for digital markets. The new regime will include: 
○ an enforceable code for digital platforms with substantial and enduring 
market power, which will promote competition in digital markets including 
those funded by online advertising and ensure the sustainability of high-
quality journalism and news publishing 
○ the establishment of a dedicated Digital Markets Unit (DMU) in 2021 to 
introduce, maintain and enforce a code of conduct.  
● The announcement was included in the government response to the Competition 
and Markets Authority’s recent market study into online platforms and digital 
advertising. The Competition and Markets Authority found that Google and 
Facebook have market power in search, social media and online advertising 
markets.  
● The government accepted the six strategic recommendations in Unlocking Digital 
Competition (the Furman Review), and at the March Budget, commissioned a new 
Digital Markets Taskforce to advise on the design and implementation of the pro-
competition regime. The Taskforce published their advice in December 2020 and the 
government will respond in due course. 
 
Cairncross Review on sustainable journalism 
 
● The Cairncross Review was commissioned by the Department for Digital, Culture, 
Media and Sport in March 2018 to examine the sustainability of high quality 
journalism in the UK. The Review put forward a set of recommendations to help 
secure the future sustainability of the press sector, focusing on issues surrounding 
tech platforms, digital advertising and public interest journalism. 
● The government is supportive of the majority of recommendations, including the 
publication of a media literacy strategy, support for platforms to help users better 
identify the reliability and trustworthiness of news sources and the introduction of a  
‘news quality obligation’ on platforms.  
● The Review also identified an unbalanced relationship between online platforms and 
news publishers, with the potential to threaten the viability of news publishers’ 
businesses. In response, the Review recommended the establishment of new codes 
of conduct aimed at rebalancing the relationship between publishers and platforms. 
● The enforceable code aimed at promoting competition in digital markets announced 
on 27 November 2020 is consistent with, and delivers on the substance of the similar 
proposal put forward in the Cairncross Review into sustainable journalism.  
 
International Context
The White Paper set out our ambition that the UK’s approach to online harms can lead
towards new, global approaches for online safety that support our democratic values, and
promote a free, open and secure internet. The government recognises that the proliferation




        
      
 
        
            
          
  
 
          
       
        
 
      
         
           
        
      
 
          
          
       
          
       
  
 
        
              
  
 
        
      
       
       
 
           
     
 
    
              
              
         




    
   
to tackle it. The government is continuing to engage with other countries as the government
develops our approach and shares our experiences. 
6.4 Countries around the world are grappling with how to make the internet a safer
environment for users. The regulator will take an international approach, working with other
international regulators, to ensure effective enforcement and promote best practice at a global
level.
6.5 The government continues to engage with international partners to learn from their
experiences and build consensus around shared approaches to tackling online harms that
uphold our democratic values and promote a free, open and secure internet.
6.6 International collaboration remains vital. The government welcomes international,
industry-led, multi-stakeholder initiatives – including initiatives supported by the UN and other
multi-lateral bodies – such as the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, the
WePROTECT Global Alliance, and wider initiatives such as the Freedom Online Coalition and 
the Technology Coalition Fighting Child Sexual Abuse.
6.7 The UK government is a member of the newly established Independent Advisory
Committee to the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism alongside the governments of
Canada, France, Japan, New Zealand, Ghana, and USA, as well as representatives from civil
society. In 2020 the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism became an independent
organisation with a stated mission to prevent terrorists and violent extremists from exploiting
digital platforms.
6.8 The UK is also a signatory of the ‘Christchurch Call to Action’, which was launched in May
2019 to prevent the abuse of the internet as occurred in and after the Christchurch attacks in 
New Zealand.50 
6.9 In March 2020 the UK, alongside its Five Country partners, launched the Voluntary
Principles to Counter Online Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. These principles set out
actions companies can take to combat online child sexual exploitation and abuse, and were
developed in consultation with tech companies and non governmental organisations.51 
6.10 Since the publication of the Online Harms White Paper, more countries have taken action
to tackle harmful online content domestically.
6.11 Ireland’s General Scheme for an Online Safety and Media Regulation Bill was published 
in January 2020. The proposed Bill will establish a framework for the regulation of online safety
to tackle the spread of harmful online content. A new Online Safety Commissioner will form
part of a Media Commission which will govern the framework through both binding online
safety codes and compliance, enforcement and sanction powers.
50 ‘Christchurch Call: To Eliminate Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content Online’ (last viewed in
November 2020)
51 ‘Voluntary Principles to Counter Online Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse’ Five Country





      
           
           
         
     
 
         
        
          
           
          
             
 
        





         
            
          
             
   
 
     
        
 
             
        
         
       












6.12 Following a consultation, in May 2019 Australia’s Office of the eSafety Commissioner
published Safety by Design Principles as a guideline for businesses to assess, review and
embed user safety into online services. The initiative intends to drive up the standards of online
product development by providing a template for all businesses to improve the transparency
of their systems and empower users to manage their own safety.
6.13 The European Commission has recently consulted on a Digital Services Act package,
which will update liability and safety rules for digital platforms, services and products. The Act
will propose new rules to increase the responsibilities of online platforms and information
society service providers and reinforce the oversight over platforms’ content policies in the
European Union. The consultation on the proposed legislation, published in June 2020, sought
stakeholders' views to better understand issues around harms in the digital environment.
6.14 The government will continue to work with our international partners to promote user
safety online, strengthen a free, open and secure internet and build public trust in digital
services.
Devolution
6.15 Internet law and regulation is a reserved policy area. The White Paper stated that
“Internet services and their regulation is a reserved issue, therefore the government intends
for our proposed framework to apply on a UK wide basis”. However, the government is
conscious that some of the harms that will likely be in the scope and some aspects of
enforcement involve devolved competences.
6.16 The government is working closely with our colleagues in the respective devolved
administrations, to ensure that such issues are taken into account.
6.17 In addition, the regulator will need to be able to operate in the devolved jurisdictions and
ensure that devolved considerations are effectively built into their work. Ofcom already has a
strong presence in all of the devolved administrations, and close working relationships with
the devolved administrations. The government is working with both Ofcom’s devolved offices





     
 
          
             
        
        
          
        
        
 
             
         
          
             
       
            
           
 
      
     
 
  
Part 7: Conclusion and next steps
7.1 The development of the online harms regime represents an important step in the UK’s
strategy to create a coherent and pro-innovation framework for the governance of digital
technologies. Proportionate and risk-based regulatory interventions, underpinned by strong
institutions, will build user confidence in the digital economy and drive economic growth. The
proposed regime also highlights that online safety is a shared responsibility between
government, users and companies. It is critical to ensure that users can make informed
decisions and have tools available to them to manage their online experience.
7.2 The consultation highlighted the urgent need for action to protect users, particularly
children, from significant harm. Companies and user groups welcomed the government’s
intention to provide regulatory clarity and certainty. The responses to the consultation also
emphasised the need to ensure that the scope of the regulatory framework is tightly defined
and that it includes strong safeguards for users’ rights online. The further details and changes
to the policy position set out in this document reflect the feedback that the government has
received since the publication of the Online Harms White Paper in April 2019.
7.3 The Online Safety Bill, which will give effect to the regulatory framework outlined in this








   
      
          
       
           
    
 
         
         
          
 
         
          
          
          
   
         
 
  
       
      
         
       
          
      
 
         
 
        
         
          
 
       
         
         
 
         
  
           
           
          
     
Annex A
Guiding principles for the regulatory framework
The overarching purpose of the regulatory framework will be to improve user safety online,
with a particular focus on illegal harms and the protection of children. The regulator and
companies will be required to carry out their responsibilities under the framework in line with
the following guiding principles:
➢ Improving user safety: taking a risk-based approach that considers harm to individuals.
➢ Protecting children: requiring higher levels of protection for services used by children.
➢ Transparency and accountability: increasing user awareness about incidence of and
response to harms.
➢ Pro innovation: supporting innovation and reducing the burden on business.
➢ Proportionality: acting in proportion to the severity of harm and resources available.
➢ Protection of users’ rights online: including freedom of expression and right to privacy.
➢ Systems and processes: taking a system and processes approach rather than focusing
on individual pieces of content.
How the new regulatory framework will be delivered against the guiding principles
Improving user safety
● The duty of care will require in-scope companies to have appropriate systems and
processes in place to improve the safety of their users.
● The regulator will issue codes of practice to outline the processes that companies need
to adopt to demonstrate that they have fulfilled the duty of care.
● The government has issued interim codes of practice on terrorism and child sexual
exploitation and abuse, alongside this response, due to the seriousness of these illegal
harms.
● All companies in scope will have to tackle relevant illegal content and activity on their
services.
● All companies likely to be accessed by children will have to prioritise the protection of
children. These companies will need to put in place measures to keep children safe
from harmful activity and prevent them from accessing age-inappropriate or harmful
content.
● Companies providing Category 1 services will have to fulfil a duty of care towards adult
users accessing legal but harmful content and activity on their services.
● Companies in scope will be required to have effective user reporting and redress 
mechanisms.
● The transparency framework will allow users to make informed decisions about which
services they use.
● The regulator will be able to take enforcement action against any in-scope company
providing services to UK users, irrespective of where it is based in the world.
● The regulator will promote education about online safety and the use of safety




           
   
         
        
        
 
  
       
            
           
          
    
           
             
            
        
   
       
  
         
          
         
            
 
  
          
       
  
        
         
     
          
        
   
       
       
 
  
         
    
          
         
             
           
       
          
        
   
important for users to be able to critically and independently manage their own risks
around legal harms.
● The government’s safety by design framework will set out clear principles and practical
guidance for companies on how to build safer online products and services, thereby
reducing the burden on the user to manage their own safety.
Protecting children
● The regulatory framework will legally require companies likely to be accessed by
children to provide a higher level of protection for children, to take reasonable steps to
protect them from accessing age-inappropriate or harmful content, and to protect them 
from other harmful activity. This includes being targeted by offenders (for example, in 
cases of child sexual exploitation and abuse).
● The differentiated approach includes a focus on keeping children safe online. All
companies in scope will be required to assess whether their service is likely to be
accessed by children, and if so to take steps to protect children on their services.
● The regulator will require companies’ user redress mechanisms, where appropriate, to
be suitable for and accessible to children.
● The government expects the regulator to prioritise the protection of children in its
approach to enforcement action.
● There is an existing programme of work to help deliver the commitment to protect
children online, ahead of the introduction of the regulatory framework. This includes
the Information Commissioner’s Office Age Appropriate Design Code, the interim code
on practice on Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and our ‘One Stop Shop’ guidance.
Transparency and accountability
● All companies providing Category 1 services will be required to publish transparency
reports, which will empower users to make informed decisions about which services
they use.
● The Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport will have the power to
extend the scope of companies who will be required to publish transparency reports,
beyond those providing Category 1 services, if necessary.
● The regulator will oversee the implementation of clear and transparent user redress
mechanisms. The regulator will make public the outcome of super-complaints to
ensure transparency in its decision-making processes.
● A statutory appeals mechanism to challenge the regulator’s decisions will ensure the
accountability of the regulator and build trust and credibility in the regime.
Pro innovation
● Companies will receive support from the regulator to understand and comply with the
regulatory framework in a proportionate and effective manner.
● The differentiated approach will mitigate the risk of disproportionate burdens on smaller
businesses by narrowing the scope of companies that will have to comply with the duty
of care, with regard to legal but harmful content and activity accessed by adults.
● Companies that are judged to be sufficiently low-risk will be exempt from transparency
reporting requirements, reflecting the diversity of services in scope.
● Ofcom’s funding model will introduce a high threshold for notification and the payment





           
      
       
          
           
     
             
       
       
 
 
          
        
      
         
       
        
         
     
        
      
         
       
             
           
         
            
      
       
              
     
    
           
             
           
    
               
   
         
  
             
        
        
          
   
● Potential sanctions for non-compliance will be proportionate to potential or actual harm
caused and the size and revenue of the company.
● The government, supported by the regulator, will deliver a series of measures to
support the rapid growth of the safety tech sector, to help ensure that companies have
access to a range of tools to deliver safer user experiences. The regulator will also be
required to pay due regard to promoting innovation.
● Exemptions will apply to online product and service reviews as well as ‘below the line’
comments. This will reduce the regulatory burden on many low-risk businesses who
have a low degree of user interactions and user generated content.
Proportionality
● All companies will be required to take reasonable and proportionate action to improve
the safety of users on their services, but the framework will minimise burdens,
particularly on small businesses and civil society organisations.
● The regulator will take a deliberately risk-based, targeted and proportionate approach
to ensure its activity reflects the size, severity of harm and capacity of companies.
● To ensure proportionality, the regulatory framework will establish differentiated
expectations on companies for illegal and legal but harmful content and activity.
Companies in scope whose services are likely to be accessed by children will be
expected to have robust systems and processes in place to protect children.
● The regulator’s initial focus will be on those companies whose services give rise to 
the biggest and clearest risk of harm to users.
● Minimum thresholds will apply for transparency reporting and the reporting
requirements will be proportionate to the type of service and risk factors involved.
● Ofcom’s funding model will introduce a high threshold for the payment of fees. The
fees will be proportionate to the company’s global revenue and activity.
● The regulator will take enforcement action on an escalating scale, using its powers in
a proportionate manner, and will not require nominated representatives.
● The regulator will have strong enforcement powers, including business disruption
measures, to be used as a last resort where other interventions have failed to tackle
the harm occurring on a service.
Protecting users’ rights online
● The framework seeks to protect users' rights online, particularly the rights to freedom
of expression and privacy. By reducing the prevalence of abuse online, it seeks to
enable more people to exercise their right to freedom of expression online, without fear
of abuse or discrimination.
● To protect freedom of expression, the regulation will treat illegal and legal but harmful
content for in-scope services differently.
● Legislation will include safeguards for media freedom, ensuring users continue to have
access to reliable information. 
● The regulation will not put new limits on online anonymity. The regulatory approach will
by design address abuse online whilst protecting freedom of expression.
● Effective transparency reporting will help ensure moderation is well-founded, as the





      
         
       
          
         
          
              
 
       
            
      
            
  
           
       
         
       
    
           
 
  
            
          
 
          
        
       
        
       
        
    
          
  
        
        
        
   
             
    
            
           






● Escalating enforcement sanctions will avoid incentivising content takedown, with
judicial oversight to safeguard the most severe sanctions like blocking. However,
companies in scope will retain their existing legal liabilities for illegal content.
● User redress mechanisms will enable users to challenge content that unduly restricts
their freedom of expression and to more effectively appeal content removal.
● Ofcom will accept super-complaints demonstrating substantial evidence of a systemic
issue that is causing harm, or risks causing harm, including about limits on freedom of
expression.
● The regulator’s powers requiring the use of technology to proactively identify illegal
content and activity will be subject to strict safeguards, ensuring any interference with
users’ rights to privacy is proportionate to the risk of harm. These powers will be used 
only where there are no alternative measures that are capable of achieving the same
aim.
● The regulator will produce an annual report, including a statement on how users’ rights
are being protected, which will be laid before Parliament.
● Any party with sufficient interest will be able to appeal the regulator’s decisions, which 
is an important safeguard for the protection of users’ rights.
● The government’s media literacy strategy will support users to think critically about
information online, to manage their privacy and to report harmful content.
Systems and processes approach
● The new regulatory framework will focus on the wider systems and processes that
services have in place to deal with online harms, taking a proportionate and risk-based
approach.
● Ofcom will not investigate individual pieces of content or arbitrate on individual cases.
It will instead consider whether in-scope companies put in place appropriate processes
to identify and mitigate the risk of harm to their users.
● Codes of practices will set out the systems and processes that companies need to
adopt to fulfil their duty of care. These could include: 
○ Processes for accurately assessing the risk of harmful content and activity 
occurring on a company’s services.
○ Appropriate governance systems for managing risk, including the involvement
of senior personnel.
○ Content moderation approaches for different types of harmful content.
○ Tools to support users to manage harm.
○ Processes to allow users to report harmful content or activity and to appeal the
takedown of their content.
○ Processes to understand the impact of online safety measures on freedom of
expression and introduce appropriate mitigating measures.
● This list is not exhaustive. Companies will be expected to tailor systems and processes
to the services they offer and regulatory expectations will be proportionate to the
severity of the potential harm and resources available to companies.
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